24 April 2026.

Part I — Situation overview

On 23 April 2026 the Magyar Nemzeti Bank opened a formal investigation in the wake of former MNB President András Simor’s public blackmail allegations. On leaving the Erste Bank supervisory board, Simor spoke openly about the central bank having threatened him over a critical newspaper article; Erste itself also confirmed the pattern of questionable treatment, while György Matolcsy offers written explanations on the missing MNB assets. MIAK’s reading in one sentence: separating central-bank independence from the handling of commercial banks is an institutional minimum — the review of the MNB for 2013–2025 is one of the largest open institutional questions of the change of government.

Part II — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK formulates three cumulative proposals:

  1. External international audit of the MNB’s regulatory decisions for 2013–2025. Conducted by a joint expert group of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the ECB (European Central Bank) — to be convened by 30 November 2026, with a first report by 30 June 2027. The audit should sit within programme point G1 (data-driven budgeting) and programme point A9 (spin-dictatorship prevention index).
  2. Full transparency of the MNB foundations’ assets. The assets accumulated since 2014 should be turned into a line-by-line, real-time dashboard on the A1 programme point public-funds dashboard — every property, security, non-profit grant, scholarship-purpose payment, with market value and audit trail.
  3. Statutory guarantee against the instrumentalisation of regulatory powers. The new central-bank act should include an explicit provision that explicitly prohibits the use of regulatory authority against a market competitor; sanction for breach: recall from the supervisory office + liability in damages. It should include an independent supervisory ombudsman’s office on the model of programme point G6 (programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture).

Part III — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Central-bank independence Public exposure of the questionable treatment and the statutory guarantee restore the MNB’s international credit — ECB, IMF Article IV, S&P and Moody’s credit rating agencies would record a positive shift. If the investigation narrows to the Simor case and the institutional pattern is not disclosed, restoration is only partial — the narrative remains “case-by-case handling”.
Commercial banking A statutory ban on regulatory instrumentalisation reduces banks’ political exposure, improves willingness to flow into the Hungarian market. The statutory amendment requires a two-thirds majority — if the Tisza two-thirds (141/52/6 ratio) focuses elsewhere, the amendment may slip to 2027.
Prosecution / rule of law The central-bank investigation — if it actually leads to a substantive indictment — is the first institutional test of the post-Péter Polt prosecution service; a positive outcome sets a precedent for further review cases. If the investigation is framed as “political revenge”, the defence may raise procedural irregularity, and the trial may later fail.
International credit A positive outcome of the IMF/ECB audit may bring a decrease in the Hungarian sovereign spread (estimate: 25–40 basis points over 12 months). If the audit slips in time or is only partially made public, the market effect is absent.

The tipping point of the trade-off is the institutional depth of the investigation. If only the Simor case is closed out, it is a short-term political success and a long-term institutional loss. If the MNB foundations and the regulatory decisions of 2013–2025 are scrutinised jointly, the change of government turns into substantive institutional reform.

Part IV — Measurability and summary

4.1 What should be tracked? (proposed KPIs — Key Performance Indicators)

  • Date of establishment of the international audit: proposed 30 November 2026.
  • Publication date of the first audit report: proposed 30 June 2027.
  • Completion of the MNB foundations on the public-funds dashboard: 100% by 31 March 2027 in the A1 frame.
  • Hungarian sovereign-spread movement: target −25 basis points over 12 months (indicator of international institutional trust).
  • Central-bank ombudsman complaint statistics: annual published report from 2027 onwards.

4.2 Summary

MIAK regards the restoration of central-bank independence not as a personal but as an institutional reform question. The Simor case is the surface; the deeper question is how the regulatory power operated between 2013 and 2025, and what statutory guarantees are needed so that this mode of operation does not return. MIAK’s ask of decision-makers: reform should be framed not as a narrative of political revenge, but as an internationally recognised audit procedure and a well-drafted statutory guarantee.

Part V — Reasoning and sources

5.1 Detailed situation overview

5.1.1 Context of the topic

Under György Matolcsy’s MNB presidency between 2013 and 2023 the MNB-foundations system was built out (approx. HUF 250–300 billion of public money placed in foundations, primarily to finance the Pallas Athéné family) along with an active, often non-standard supervision of the commercial banking market. The reports of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) (2015–2022) partially uncovered the asset-management anomalies, but a substantive institutional investigation was forestalled under political protection. András Simor — the pre-2013 president, and from 2013 an Erste Bank supervisory-board member — now publicly stated, on leaving, that his own person and publications had also been the target of focused central-bank proceedings.

5.1.2 Press framing across the spectrum

5.2 Facts and data

  • Assets of the MNB foundations between 2014 and 2023: approx. HUF 250–300 billion (ÁSZ reports, partial data)
  • András Simor’s presidential term: 2007–2013
  • György Matolcsy’s presidential term: 2013–2023
  • Launch of the official MNB investigation: 23 April 2026
  • Erste Bank supervisory-board membership: András Simor 2013–2026 (departure)
  • IMF Article IV Hungary 2024: partial observation on MNB asset management

5.3 Policy angles

  • Economics (programme points and background material) — central-bank role, reserve policy, monetary transparency;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points and background material) — asset audit of the MNB foundations, integration of ÁSZ reports, whistleblowing system;
  • Justice (programme points) — prosecutorial independence in the central-bank investigation, regulation of administrative proceedings.

5.4 International comparison

The 2020 audit of the Slovenian central bank (joint work of the ECB and the Slovenian state audit office) is a precedent: an international expert group reviewed the operation of a mid-sized EU member’s central bank between 2009 and 2019. The audit was completed in 11 months, and 80% of its recommendations were implemented at statutory level. The Hungarian audit can be conducted within the same time-frame and expert composition.

5.5 Scholarly grounding

5.5.1 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

Kaufmann (former senior researcher at the World Bank, co-author of the Worldwide Governance Indicators — WGI) developed measurable indicators of the quality of governance. The MIAK angle: the “regulatory quality” indicator is precisely what signals, in cases like Simor’s, when the real content of a formal power diverges from its documented function. The WGI time-series for Hungary between 2013 and 2025 has tracked consistently downward on the “regulatory quality” dimension — the aim of the audit is to evidence this downward trend in concrete cases.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters

5.5.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale Law School) analyses regulatory shakedown as a hidden corruption channel: it is not money that changes hands (not bribery), but the regulator uses its authority to silence a competitor or a critic. The Simor case — if the allegations are well-founded — would be a textbook case of this category. The book emphasises: regulatory shakedown is frequent even in countries with lower formal corruption indices, since it does not involve money flows but abuse of competence.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

5.6 Principled basis (linked to MIAK foundational values)

  • Transparency: the international audit and the asset dashboard of the MNB foundations guarantee public visibility of public-money use.
  • Accountability: the statutory articulation of the ban on instrumentalising regulatory power and the ombudsman mechanism make every step open to ex post scrutiny.
  • Data-drivenness: the WGI indicator and the ECB/IMF audit methodology provide a measurable basis, not a political verdict.
  • Ideology-free stance: the proposal protects central-bank autonomy in both directions — neither the government nor the commercial banks may abuse the system.

Economics

  • G1 — Data-driven budgeting
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-funds dashboard
  • A5 — Whistleblowing system
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship prevention index

Justice

  • I4 — Defence of judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Proposed new programme point: Independent supervisory ombudsman’s office alongside the central bank and the successor to the PSZÁF — for the Economics area, as a complement to G6.

5.8 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 April 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann: Governance Matters
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economics (programme points; programme-point ID: G1, G6)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme-point ID: A1, A9)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme-point ID: I4)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 April 2026 — topic 3, score 78/100

Additional public data sources:

  • ÁSZ reports on the MNB foundations (2015–2022)
  • ECB Financial Stability Review (annual)
  • IMF Article IV consultations with Hungary (most recent: 2024)
  • Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann/Kraay/World Bank) — Hungary time-series

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