Part I — Situation overview

On Sunday 7 June 2026 the Ministry of the Interior announced in a statement: the asylum authority began already in May the review of the refugee statuses granted on a political basis under the previous, Orbán government. The authority officially notified those concerned and called on them to appear in person — according to the statement this is “an indispensable condition for clarifying the facts”. Whoever does not appear will have their case decided in their absence, on the basis of the available data; the authority’s decision can be challenged by a legal remedy before a court, and the details become known to the public only after the final decision on withdrawal. The matter affects most of all the legal status of two Polish politicians — Marcin Romanowski, former deputy justice minister, and Zbigniew Ziobro, former justice minister, politicians of the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) party — as well as that of Nikola Gruevski, former North Macedonian head of government. The two Polish politicians left Hungary after the April 2026 election.

The situation is of a dual legal nature. Asylum and immigration enforcement are the law-enforcement competence of the Ministry of the Interior (not a defence task), and the withdrawal of asylum status is a binding legal procedure, not a political decision: it requires an individualised examination of the facts, the hearing of the person concerned and the possibility of judicial review. In parallel there is also a foreign-policy dimension: according to the signal of the Polish foreign ministry, Warsaw does not understand why it has not received a substantive answer from the Hungarian side in the case of the politicians who departed to escape criminal proceedings — the new cabinet, a good three weeks after its formation, has likewise not answered, just like the previous government.

In MIAK’s reading the character of the problem is not who is likeable and who is not, but whether the legal-institutional character of asylum can be preserved. If the status was once handed out as a political favour, and is now withdrawn as a political gesture, then the legal institution is harmed in both cases — only with the opposite sign.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the interpretive frame. Henry Kissinger (American diplomat and former secretary of state, a defining figure of the realist school of foreign policy) in his work World Order (2014) derives from the Westphalian system the basic principle of the modern international order: states are sovereign on their own territory and refrain from interfering in one another’s internal affairs — yet this order stems not from moral loftiness but from practical self-restraint, and is sustained by mutual trust. Applied to Hungary–Poland relations the lesson is dual: on the one hand the asylum decision is indeed a sovereign competence, on the other hand EU membership imposes on the member state a common asylum frame (the Dublin III system and the qualification directive — that is, the EU set of rules that determines who qualifies as a refugee), and bilateral trust is a foreign-policy capital that disregarding requests consumes. In Kissinger’s balance of legitimacy and power, legality is not a constraint on sovereignty but the source of lasting authority. The detailed literature treatment — with a quotation — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three mutually reinforcing steps that serve the depoliticisation of asylum and the restoration of bilateral trust.

3.1 Individualised review open to court challenge (during the entire procedure)

The review is rule-of-law-compliant only if every case is judged separately, in an individualised examination of the facts: with the hearing of the person concerned, the assessment of their evidence, and the actual possibility of judicial review of the decision. A collective, group review under the umbrella label of “statuses granted on a political basis” would be just as troubling as the politically motivated granting was — the legal institution is harmed in both cases. The responsible parties are the asylum authority (in the law-enforcement competence of the Ministry of the Interior) and the court conducting the review, and the deadline is the entire duration of the ongoing proceedings. This requires, in the spirit of I6 (Lowering the threshold of citizens’ legal enforcement), the actual accessibility of the remedy, and, under I3 (Legislative impact assessment), well-foundedness.

3.2 A substantive, dated answer to the Polish request (within 30 days)

MIAK proposes that the Hungarian side give a substantive, legally reasoned answer to the Polish request — regardless of whether the answer ultimately contains cooperation or refusal. Silence is the worst option: it does not protect sovereignty but erodes trust, and creates precisely the impression the new government wants to avoid — that the practice does not differ from that of the previous cabinet. Legal precision is important: the withdrawal of asylum status and extradition (or the surrender procedure within the EU) are two separate legal questions; in Gruevski’s case the acquisition of Hungarian citizenship makes extradition legally far harder than that of the two Polish politicians. This is the direct application of the KP3 (Transparent foreign policy) programme point. The responsible parties are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, and the deadline is 30 days.

3.3 The principled fixing of the depoliticisation of asylum (until the review is concluded)

MIAK proposes that the government also fix at the level of principle: the granting and withdrawal of asylum are alike solely a matter of legal, not political, consideration. This is the practical unfolding of the KP4 (Principled pragmatism doctrine): neither ideological rigidity nor day-to-day political gain may guide the decision, only the transparent, legally well-founded procedure. The responsible party is the Government, and the time frame is the conclusion of the review.

The three steps are bound together by a single principle: asylum remains a legal institution if the procedure is consistent in both directions. The lesson of the Kissingerian frame is precisely that the lasting authority of a sovereign decision is given not by speed but by legality and predictability.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Rule of law Asylum regains its legal-institutional character if the procedure is individualised and open to court challenge The group, politically framed review creates a new legal grievance and may be overturned by the courts
Foreign policy A substantive answer restores bilateral trust with Poland and strengthens EU credibility Silence causes lasting tension and identifies the new government with the previous one’s practice
Public security / law enforcement The lawful procedure reinforces that asylum may not serve as a refuge from criminal proceedings Because of the political overtone the case may lead to conflating extradition and asylum

The main consideration is the relationship of speed and legality. It would be politically attractive to close the case quickly and spectacularly, but it is precisely the haste that carries the greatest risk: a group-handled withdrawal overturned by the courts would harm the government’s credibility more than the slower, individualised route. The proposal works if the asylum (law-enforcement–legal) thread and the foreign-policy (response) thread are handled separately, and neither is subordinated to the day-to-day political message.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking over the next 6–12 months:

  • Whether the review decisions are made in an individualised procedure, with reasoning, ensuring a judicial remedy (yes/no, by case).
  • Whether a substantive, dated Hungarian answer to the Polish request has arrived.
  • How many review decisions were challenged in court, and what percentage of these were upheld (the yardstick of well-foundedness).
  • Whether the government has fixed at the level of principle the apolitical nature of asylum (for granting and withdrawal alike).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: asylum is not a political instrument but a legal institution — and it remains so only if the procedure is consistent in both directions. MIAK asks the government to conduct the review in an individualised procedure open to court challenge, to give a substantive, legal answer to the Polish request, and to fix at the level of principle the apolitical nature of asylum. This position stems from two of MIAK’s foundational values: from being ideology-free, because MIAK holds the new government to the same rule-of-law yardstick whose absence it criticised in the previous one — the principle does not depend on who is in power; and from accountability, because the substantive answer to the bilateral request and the actual possibility of judicial review are what make the decision verifiable. The credibility of a rule-of-law turn is measured by whether power subjects itself, too, to its own yardstick.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The sources framed the two main threads — the legal procedure and the political message — with differing weight. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (444.hu, Telex, HVG) also addressed the legal details: 444.hu and Telex set out precisely the content of the authority’s notification (appearance in person, decision in absence, judicial remedy), and Telex most highlighted the specifics of the charges (suspicion against Ziobro of forming a criminal organisation, an arrest warrant). The economic band (Portfolio) gave a matter-of-fact, statement-based summary. The conservative band (Mandiner), by contrast, placed the emphasis on the Hungarian side’s silence and the unanswered Polish extradition request, framing the government’s helplessness. The common blind spot of the framings is the legal distinction: the withdrawal of asylum status and extradition are separate legal categories, which the political framings often conflate — MIAK’s reading therefore consciously separates the two.

6.2 Facts and data

  • Asylum and immigration enforcement are the law-enforcement competence of the Ministry of the Interior (not a defence task).
  • The withdrawal of asylum status is a binding legal procedure: an individualised examination of the facts, a hearing, a judicial remedy.
  • Among those concerned, the Polish prosecution has formulated against Zbigniew Ziobro the suspicion of forming and directing a criminal organisation (according to press reports, with damage of more than 150 million zloty, around 12.7 billion forints); Ziobro is under an arrest warrant in Poland.
  • The EU frame of asylum (Dublin III, the qualification directive) ties the member-state procedure to common rules.

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — transparent, principled foreign policy requires a substantive answer to the bilateral request;
  • Justice (programme points) — the individualised asylum review procedure with an ensured remedy;
  • Public security and law enforcement (background material) — the immigration-enforcement competence and the lawful procedure as a limit on the abuse of asylum.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Henry Kissinger: World Order

Kissinger derives from the Peace of Westphalia the basic principle of the modern international order, in which states are sovereign on their own territory and refrain from interfering in one another’s internal affairs:

“It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other’s domestic affairs and checking each other’s ambitions through a general equilibrium of power.”

In the Hungary–Poland case this frame gives a dual lesson: the asylum decision is indeed a sovereign competence, but lasting authority stems not from the demonstration of sovereignty but from legality and the maintenance of mutual trust. Leaving the Polish request unanswered may seem a sovereign gesture in the short term, but it actually consumes precisely the capital of trust on which cooperation within the EU is built.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: World Order

6.5 International comparison

The use of asylum as a political instrument — whether for granting or for withdrawal — is not a uniquely Hungarian phenomenon; the EU asylum acquis (Dublin III, the qualification directive) and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union tie the member-state procedure to common rules precisely so that protection cannot become the subject of a bilateral political bargain. It is established practice of bilateral legal assistance and criminal-procedure cooperation in the EU that member states answer one another’s requests substantively and on time — silence is exceptional and trust-eroding. Hungarian practice will be credible in international comparison too if it conducts the review within the common legal frame, individualised and transparently.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Principled pragmatism doctrine

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment
  • I6 — Lowering the threshold of citizens’ legal enforcement

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 8 June 2026 — topic 3):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: World Order

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3, I6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 8 June 2026 — topic 3, score: 84/100

Additional public data sources:

  • EU asylum acquis (Dublin III, the qualification directive), the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union

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