Part I — Situation overview

In early June 2026 Ferenc Biró, president of the Integrity Authority, made grave statements, first in the Sunday video of the DE! Action Community and then in a Monday-evening television interview. By his estimate, by 2025 some 20 per cent of Hungarian budgetary expenditure had drained away through corruption channels — whereas this ratio was still around 5 per cent in 2010 — and over the past 16 years on the order of 60 trillion forints of assets may have disappeared. He himself stressed that this latter figure is a “conservative” estimate, stemming from thirty years of professional work and “not auditable”. Among the cases under examination the Authority’s head mentioned a communications corporate group’s roughly 1,300 billion forints of state contracts, the dominance of the largest state public-procurement actor, and an elderly-care programme of up to a trillion forints in scale.

The subject is not without precedent, nor is it merely a disturbing number. The Integrity Authority was created in 2022 within the framework of the EU conditionality system, expressly as the guardian of the lawful use of EU money; the very condition of the funds now releasable is the Authority’s substantive operation. Biró now also claimed that in March 2024 he was summoned to a meeting at the Ministry of Justice, where the then justice minister, Bence Tuzson, and János Bóka, minister for European affairs, in his view essentially called on him “not to touch the milestones” — that is, not to question, through on-site inspections, the fulfilment of the commitments to be verified towards Brussels. Bence Tuzson acknowledged that the meeting had taken place and that he had initiated it in his own office, but firmly denied that they had interfered with the Authority’s operation. Fidesz brushed off the statements by saying that Biró — against whom proceedings are themselves under way — “wants to save his own skin”.

In MIAK’s reading the news raises two questions to be kept apart. One is the order of magnitude of the corruption loss, which must be handled with methodological discipline; the other is the independence and actual powers of the Integrity Authority, one of the now-forming elements of the Hungarian system of checks and balances. The two must neither be conflated nor sunk in the din of political battle: MIAK’s credibility stems precisely from placing measurability and institution-building, rather than outrage, at the centre.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s proposals, it is worth fixing the scientific frame in which the news’s two threads can be interpreted. Daniel Kaufmann and his co-authors (World Bank researchers who developed the international governance-indicator system still in use today, the Worldwide Governance Indicators) built six aggregate governance measures — including the “control of corruption” and “rule of law” indices — and showed that “the quality of governance matters for development”; at the same time these indicators are estimates, with quantified uncertainty — and it is precisely this frame that counsels caution towards a “20 per cent”-type claim. Robert Klitgaard (American economist, creator of the C = M + D − A economic model of corruption) gives the institutional answer to this: the model of an independent corruption-investigation agency of the Hong Kong ICAC and Singapore CPIB type shows that corruption can be curbed if the probability of detection is durably, institutionally high. The two propositions together give MIAK’s twin message: measure with methodological discipline, and build independent investigative capacity. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn a disturbing statement into an institutional lesson.

3.1 A methodological foundation for the corruption-loss estimate

The first step is the cool handling of the figures. The “60 trillion” is, by the Authority head’s own words, a cumulative, non-auditable 16-year estimate — it cannot be confused with the annual ~20 per cent ratio indicated for 2025. MIAK proposes that the corruption-loss estimate be given a public, documented methodology: what the base refers to, which year, estimate or measured data, what the margin of error is. This is akin to the annual index logic of G6 (programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture): the aim is not scaremongering but data that is comparable over time and verifiable. In the Kaufmann-type measurement frame (see 6.4.1) this means that the uncertainty must always be stated alongside the figure — otherwise even a credible claim becomes attackable.

3.2 Reinforcing the Integrity Authority’s investigative powers and independence in law

The second and most important proposal is that the Authority’s investigative and document-request powers, and its independence, be reinforced by law — with appointment and operational guarantees that remove it from the direct influence of the majority of the day. If it is true that the Authority was previously obstructed by political pressure, that is precisely proof that independence cannot be a function of goodwill but requires an institutional guarantee. This is the core of A10 (independent corruption-investigation office, CPIB model): the success of the Hong Kong and Singapore agency stood or fell on stable powers and politics-free appointment (see 6.4.2). An important point of public law: the Integrity Authority is an investigating and signalling body — it forwards uncovered suspicion, but criminal accountability, the indictment and the verdict are the competence of the prosecution service and the courts. The reinforcement therefore does not mean turning the Authority into a “court”, but building up its uncovering capacity and a cooperation protocol with other bodies.

3.3 A prosecutorial cooperation protocol and public case handling

The third element is that the Authority’s findings should not die out. MIAK proposes a prosecutorial cooperation protocol: a mandatory, deadline-bound substantive assessment of the Authority’s complaints, and the public, anonymised traceability of case handling. The Integrity Authority has so far — by its own account — examined some 1,000 billion forints of EU funds, closed dozens of cases and is pursuing more; these findings have value only if they also reach a substantive assessment. Here the subject connects to public-procurement transparency (A2) and cohesion accountability (A8) as well.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: action against corruption stands not on the courage of one strong individual but on measurable data and an independent, stable institution. The Kaufmann-type measurement discipline and the Klitgaard-type agency model together give the frame in which the present statement can be turned into a lasting reform.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Economy / public money The corruption loss becomes measurable and reducible; the chance of EU-fund absorption rises A “20 per cent”-type claim without methodology can be discredited, and the debate drowns in political battle din
Justice With stronger powers the Authority can carry out substantive uncovering Conflation of competences: framing the Authority as a “punitive body” introduces a constitutional error into public discourse
Institutional trust The legal guarantee of independence stabilises the system If the Authority became the new majority’s instrument, the same dependence would recur, only with the sign reversed

The main consideration is the balance between credibility and political exploitation. An estimate behind which there is no public methodology easily becomes ammunition for political debate — on the side either of outrage or of denial. The proposal tips towards the risk side if the Authority’s independence stems not from an institutional guarantee but from the goodwill of the government of the day: then, in the next cycle, the pressuring can be repeated.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK considers the following suggested performance indicators (KPIs) worth tracking:

  • Authority powers: whether a law reinforces the Authority’s investigative and document-request powers, and whether it fixes an independent appointment guarantee.
  • Uncovering → proceedings ratio: what percentage of the Authority’s complaints turns into substantive prosecutorial proceedings, and with what turnaround time.
  • Methodological transparency: whether a documented methodology is published for the corruption-loss estimate (base, year, margin of error).
  • International standing: whether Hungary improves in the World Bank’s “control of corruption” indicator and in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in the coming measurement cycles.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message is twofold but points in one direction: treat the figures now voiced with methodological discipline, and reinforce the Integrity Authority’s independence and investigative powers in law. MIAK asks decision-makers that from a disturbing statement should be born not a political weapon but an institutional reform — and that they respect the order of competences: the Authority uncovers and signals, the indictment belongs to the prosecution, the verdict to the court. This proposal moves two MIAK foundational values: data-drivenness, because the corruption loss is worth quantifying only with documented, verifiable methodology, and accountability, because the uncovering is worth something only if it reaches a substantive consequence through an independent institution. It is precisely these two that move because the stake of the news is exactly the credibility of measurement and the strength of the institution — not the daily exchange of political blows.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The whole spectrum fitted the statement into its own narrative. In the left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu, ATV) the emphasis was on the pressuring claim and the admission of systemic corruption — 444.hu highlighted the Authority head’s heated words recalling the pressuring, ATV the frame of intimidation and “NER-style corruption”. The economic band (Portfolio) brought to the fore the “60 trillion” figure and its connection with the drawdown of EU funds. The pro-government, conservative band (Fidesz’s official reaction, Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) focused on undermining credibility: Biró is himself under proceedings, and therefore — by this reading — “saves his own skin”. The spectrum’s division shows well why MIAK’s party-neutral framing is warranted: the debate runs on a “revelation” versus “self-rescue” axis, while the substantive question — the methodology of the estimate and the Authority’s independence — is central on neither side.

6.2 Facts and data

  • The Integrity Authority was created in 2022 within the EU conditionality framework, as the guardian of the lawful use of EU funds.
  • Ferenc Biró’s estimate: in 2010 ~5 per cent of expenditure, by 2025 ~20 per cent drained away through corruption channels; the 16-year cumulative loss is on the order of ~60 trillion forints (an estimate “not auditable” even by the Authority head’s own account).
  • The Authority has so far examined some 1,000 billion forints of EU funds; with dozens of closed and ongoing cases, and several complaints.
  • Hungary’s “control of corruption” value in the World Bank’s governance indicators was −0.17 in 2024 (source: World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the independent investigative office, public-procurement transparency and cohesion accountability form the backbone of the proposal;
  • Economy (programme points) — the rent-seeking and regulatory-capture analysis is the structural background of the corruption loss;
  • Justice (background material) — the competence order of investigation–indictment–verdict.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Daniel Kaufmann et al.: Governance Matters

Kaufmann and his co-authors constructed six aggregate governance measures — in the dimensions of voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, the rule of law and corruption (“graft”) — and showed that these indicators are closely related to development outcomes. The key lesson of the methodology for the present Hungarian debate is not the specific figure but the discipline: every corruption metric is built from perceptual or indirect data, and must therefore be interpreted together with a margin of error. The “60 trillion” or the “20 per cent” is precisely why neither refutable nor provable as a bare statement — for MIAK it follows that the estimate must be supported by a documented methodology, otherwise even a credible claim loses its weight.

📖 Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard gives the institutional side of action against corruption: in the C = M + D − A formula, one of the most effective instruments for increasing accountability (A) is a strong, independent investigative agency that durably keeps the probability of detection high. The example of the Hong Kong ICAC (Independent Commission Against Corruption) and the Singapore CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau) shows that success rested not on stricter rhetoric but on stable statutory powers and politics-free leadership. For the Hungarian Integrity Authority it follows that the now-alleged pressuring — whatever its truth content — underlines precisely the need for an institutional guarantee of independence: the agency works if its powers do not depend on the government’s goodwill.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.5 International comparison

The independent corruption-investigation agency is not a theoretical construct: the model of Hong Kong (ICAC, 1974) and Singapore (CPIB) has been the international benchmark for decades. The common feature of both is that the investigative body operates with stable, statutory powers and leadership separate from the executive, and stands in close but clearly delimited cooperation with the prosecution service. This is the Hungarian lesson too: not the conflation of competences, but guaranteed independence built alongside the clean separation of the uncovering and the indicting functions, brings the result.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A10 — Independent Corruption-Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A2 — Public-procurement transparency

Economy

  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 9 June 2026 — topic 2):

  • [Telex] The head of the Integrity Authority says that last year 20 per cent of budgetary expenditure drained away through corruption channels — https://telex.hu/belfold/2026/06/08/biro-ferenc-integritas-hatosag-elnoke-vizsgalat-eljaras-video-egyenes-beszed
  • [Portfolio] The head of the state authority spilled the beans: 60 trillion forints may have been stolen in Hungary — https://www.portfolio.hu/unios-forrasok/20260608/kitalalt-az-allami-hivatal-vezetoje-60-ezer-milliard-forintot-lophattak-el-magyarorszagon-ket-miniszter-is-meguzente-hogy-alljon-le-841798
  • [444.hu] “I take exception…” – the head of the Integrity Authority recounted how he was pressured — https://444.hu/2026/06/07/kikerem-magamnak-hat-menjenek-a-kurva-anyjukba-elo-interjuban-mondja-el-az-integritas-hatosag-elnoke-hogy-gyakoroltak-ra-nyomast-az-orban-kormanybol
  • [444.hu] Bence Tuzson: There was indeed a three-way meeting with Ferenc Biró — https://444.hu/2026/06/08/tuzson-bence-biro-ferenc-integritas-hatosag-igazsagugyi-miniszterium
  • [24.hu] Ferenc Biró to 24.hu: I stand by all my statements — https://24.hu/belfold/2026/06/09/biro-ferenc-integritas-hatosag-reakcio-tuzson-boka-24extra/
  • [ATV] The head of the Integrity Authority speaks of intimidation and NER-style corruption — https://www.atv.hu/videok/megfelemlitesrol-es-ner-es-korrupciorol-beszel-az-integritas-hatosag-elnoke/
  • [Népszava] Fidesz rejects the statements of the Integrity Authority’s head — https://nepszava.hu/ (headline-level reference only)

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón: Governance Matters
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Note: the local file path of the book does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G6)
  • MIAK press monitor, 9 June 2026 — topic 2, score: 90/100

Additional public data sources:

  • World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 2024 — control of corruption
  • Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), OLAF statistics, EU rule-of-law country report

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