Part I — Situation overview

On 30 August 2026 Dávid Vitézy, minister for transport and investment, announced the actual start of housing crisis management. The minister’s assessment of the situation named three causes: there are not enough student hall places, not enough new housing is being built, and the condition of the existing housing stock is also deteriorating because renovations are not taking place. The figures with which he argued are telling in themselves: while in 2015 5.9 years of average earnings were enough to buy an average home, by 2025 it was 7.1 years — house prices rose by 120 per cent and incomes by 60 per cent over the same period; and for 320 thousand university students there are only 49 thousand hall places. The Wekerle Housing Construction Programme announced as the solution would devote 550 million euros of EU funding to the purpose, supplemented by market funds, counting on a total investment volume of some 2 billion euros. Work on the details now begins.

On the same day two other developments were also connected to housing. One is good news from the programme’s point of view: the winding up of the public-interest asset management foundations (KEKVAs) was completed at the end of August, and according to the minister’s statement the takeover of four foundations returned assets worth 100 billion forints to the state at his ministry. The other is bad news: at the start of the week Bayer Construct and its subsidiary ZVK Development filed for insolvency protection against themselves. The company justified the decision by the unfavourable market environment, the regulatory changes and the failure of the state purchase of the office complex in Zugló. To this comes a third thread, open for longer: according to Portfolio’s article of 14 August, 200 thousand mortgage holders do not know under what rules their monthly instalment will be set in two months’ time, because the government announcement of the phase-out on 30 September of the interest-rate cap — the state limitation, in force since 2022, on the interest of variable-rate retail mortgage loans — has to this day not been followed by legislation.

MIAK’s reading: these three threads are not three news items but three sides of a single balance sheet. On the demand side 200 thousand households are waiting for a decision; on the supply side the capacity of one of the largest contractors has become uncertain; and on the state side a programme is starting at the same time as a significant property portfolio is being returned. The missing link is named most precisely by Portfolio’s article on EU funds: money has been pouring into home renovation for years, but it is not known how much energy has been saved. The greatest trouble with housing policy in Hungary is not a shortage of funds but the absence of a measurable link between the input and the result.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three frames in the literature belong to the three threads. The work Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty (French economist, the leading researcher of long-term data on wealth inequality) shows with data that in developed countries roughly half of the capital stock is residential property. Housing policy is therefore not a sub-question of social policy but an instrument directly shaping the structure of wealth, and badly targeted subsidy does not reduce inequality but reproduces it. The book The Return of Depression Economics by Paul Krugman (American economist, awarded the Nobel memorial prize for his research in the theory of international trade) treats the risks of mortgage lending, and singles out the situation in which, after the expiry of the preferential initial interest rate, the monthly instalment jumps to a level the borrower can no longer bear. And the volume 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism by Ha-Joon Chang (Korean-born economist teaching in Cambridge, a researcher of industrial policy and development economics) describes a good bankruptcy law as the second chance given to capital — this frame is needed so that the contractor’s insolvency proceedings can be assessed not as a scandal but as an institutional question. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures, one for each of the three sides of the balance sheet.

3.1 A decision on the expiring interest subsidy, with an impact assessment, by 30 September 2026

The most pressing question is not what decision should be taken, but that one should be taken at all. MIAK proposes that the legislation on the expiry of the interest-rate cap on 30 September be published by the end of September at the latest. The legislation should be preceded by a public impact assessment stating four figures: how many households the change affects, what the average and the largest increase in the monthly instalment is, how many households move into the band of non-payment risk, and what budgetary item each variant of a gradual phase-out — termination scheduled in several steps — would represent. Even if the decision favours immediate phase-out, there should be at least 90 days of preparation time between the promulgation of the legislation and its entry into force, so that the households concerned have time to plan. This is the direct application of the I3 legislative impact assessment programme point; and the basis for refining the targeting is given by SZ1. Krugman’s analysis (see 6.4.2) warns precisely that the jump in the instalment is not an individual financial mistake but a foreseeable systemic risk — and what is foreseeable can also be managed.

3.2 A public, itemised inventory of the returned assets and a rental-housing utilisation balance (within 90 days)

The assets returned from the wound-up asset management foundations — 100 billion forints’ worth from four foundations at the transport and investment ministry — currently appear in public as a single sum. MIAK proposes that within 90 days of the takeover an itemised, public inventory be drawn up: property by property, the intended use, the estimated value, the current utilisation and the encumbrances. Alongside the inventory there should be a short utilisation balance, examining for every property suitable for residential use the possibility of use as rental housing, and giving reasons where this is rejected. This matters because the programme now starting is primarily about building, while the capacity that can be mobilised fastest is the existing stock already returned to state ownership. The proposal stands at the intersection of the SZ3 housing data platform and the EP2 housing construction data platform, and requires no new institution: drawing up an inventory is a natural part of taking over assets.

3.3 A retrospective energy-saving audit of the renovation subsidies (before the next call for applications)

According to the report of the European Court of Auditors, by January 2026 the member states had planned 43 billion euros from the recovery fund for the energy modernisation of residential buildings, but the extent of the actual energy saving can hardly be verified reliably: most of the subsidies did not go to deep renovations, the member states calculated with differing methods, and cost-effectiveness was barely examined. MIAK proposes that Hungary carry out a retrospective audit of the closed programmes before the next renovation call: it should establish, by sample-based energy measurement, what actual average saving the subsidised renovations produced, and adjust the aid intensity of the next call to this figure. This is the fulfilment of the data-driven targeting requirement of the EP3 energy efficiency programme point. The stake is not theoretical: a significant part of the funds of the next EU budget cycle would be distributed within the framework of national and regional partnership plans, tied to milestones and targets — without measurement capability Hungary starts from a weaker negotiating position.

The three proposals are bound together by a single principle: in housing policy every forint should have a traceable output. With the interest subsidy the output is the solvency of households, with the returned assets the housing stock actually put to use, with renovation the energy saved. Where these are not measured, the success of the programme remains a matter of faith — and at the next budgetary squeeze it is the first to fall victim.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Households The loan decision, together with an impact assessment, makes the coming year plannable for 200 thousand families The publicity of the impact assessment may itself trigger a market reaction if those affected try to refinance in advance en masse
Construction industry Putting the returned property stock to use may give demand-side support to a sector struggling with a shortage of orders Increasing state orders does not solve the problem of contractor concentration; the same few large players remain dominant
Budget The retrospective energy audit improves the efficiency of fund use in the next EU cycle The audit may show that the earlier programmes were of poor efficiency — this is politically burdensome after the event, but it is the condition of future targeting
Territorial balance The itemised asset inventory makes visible where usable state properties are located in the countryside Rental-housing use generates maintenance costs; without cover the deterioration of the stock continues

The main question for weighing runs between speed and soundness. On the interest subsidy time is pressing: every day of delay reduces the preparation time of the households concerned, while an impact assessment takes time. MIAK’s position is that the four requested figures — the number of those affected, the average and maximum increase in instalments, the number of those moving into the risk band, and the cost of the phase-out variants — can be produced within weeks from the available credit register data, so the two considerations do not clash. The proposal tips over to the risk side if the requirement of an impact assessment serves as a pretext for further postponing the decision. That is why MIAK proposes the 30 September deadline for the legislation itself, not merely for the analysis.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (proposed KPIs)

The performance indicators below (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) are MIAK’s proposals, not government decisions:

  • Decision deadline: whether the legislation on the phase-out of the interest subsidy, together with a public impact assessment, appeared by 30 September 2026 (yes/no).
  • Asset inventory: what percentage of the returned property stock had an itemised, public inventory within 90 days — proposed target: 100%.
  • Rental housing conversion: how many of the returned properties suitable for residential use enter rental-housing use within 24 months.
  • Energy saving: whether an average saving figure for the closed renovation programmes, supported by sample-based measurement, is available before the next call (yes/no).
  • Targeting indicator: what percentage of subsidised mortgage loans goes to the bottom five income deciles — a substantive improvement on the current 7 per cent share (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Financial Stability Report, June 2026).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s key message: the launch of the housing programme is good news, but it is not enough on its own, because the three threads of housing policy — demand, supply and state assets — currently move separately, without measurement. MIAK asks the Government to decide by 30 September on the expiring interest subsidy together with an impact assessment, to publish within 90 days the itemised inventory of the returned property assets, and to measure, before the next renovation call, what the earlier programmes produced. And it asks the public to judge housing policy not by the sums announced but by demonstrable results.

Two MIAK foundational values are in play here. Data-drivenness, because housing is the area where the largest sums flow with the least measurability — the case of the renovation subsidies shows this most sharply. And universal representation, because according to the central bank’s data the targeting of subsidies so far has been strongly skewed towards the upper income bands: 7 per cent of subsidised loans went to the bottom five income deciles. A housing policy that does not reach the 600–700 thousand families living in unworthy housing conditions does not fulfil its function — regardless of how large a sum it moves.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 The framing of the press, spectrum by spectrum

The economic band covered the topic most broadly: within a single day Portfolio carried the launch of the programme, a legal analysis of the contractor’s insolvency proceedings with an insolvency lawyer quoted, the Court of Auditors report on the unaccountability of EU renovation funds, and its own earlier analysis of the expiring mortgage loans. The paper’s framing was professional and risk-centred throughout: on the insolvency proceedings it pushed to the fore not the question of responsibility but the procedural consequence — namely what position the classification of a disputed creditor claim puts the state in within the composition with creditors.

The left-liberal band ran two different threads. 444.hu published the news of the returned assets together with an assessment of the system of asset management foundations, quoting at length the minister’s criticism of the earlier construction. The external expert analysis published on Telex’s economics blog, by contrast, approached it not as daily news but as a policy balance sheet: housing policy expenditure may reach 1,000 billion forints this year, and yet the subsidies went strongly to higher-income households. HVG framed the insolvency proceedings as a trial of strength between the government and the company group, and singled out that homebuyers and subcontractors are in the most exposed position.

The conservative band sharpened towards the supply side and the employment consequence: Magyar Nemzet put the endangering of jobs and home purchases in its headline and brought sectoral data. According to a survey by the construction industry’s representative body covering 400 companies, the sector would be capable of 15–20 per cent more output than it delivers because of the shortage of orders. And the value of newly concluded state construction orders fell from 1,710 billion forints in 2025 to 615 billion in the first half of 2026.

The three bands therefore looked at the same reality from three different risks: the economic band at procedural and accounting risk, the left-liberal at the fairness of targeting, the conservative at sectoral employment. All three approaches brought valid data — and MIAK’s proposal handles the three threads together precisely because none of them can be understood without the other two.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Price of an average home in average earnings 5.9 years (2015) → 7.1 years (2025) Dávid Vitézy; Portfolio, 30 August 2026
Growth in house prices and incomes prices +120%, incomes +60% Portfolio, 30 August 2026
Student hall places 49,000 places for 320,000 students Portfolio, 30 August 2026
EU funding of the Wekerle Housing Construction Programme EUR 550 million, expected total volume approx. EUR 2 billion Portfolio, 30 August 2026
Assets returned from the asset management foundations (transport and investment ministry) HUF 100 billion, from 4 foundations Dávid Vitézy; 444.hu, 30 August 2026
Households affected by the expiring interest subsidy approx. 200,000 Portfolio, 14 August 2026
Annual housing policy expenditure in 2026 may reach HUF 1,000 billion Áron Horváth (ELTINGA); Telex Névérték, 31 August 2026
Income distribution of subsidised mortgage loans bottom five income deciles: 7%, top five: 93% MNB, Financial Stability Report, June 2026
Families living in unworthy housing conditions 600–700 thousand Telex Névérték, 31 August 2026
New state construction orders HUF 1,710 billion (2025) → HUF 615 billion (first half of 2026) ÉVOSZ; Magyar Nemzet, August 2026
EU renovation funding from the recovery fund EUR 43 billion planned by member states up to January 2026 European Court of Auditors; Portfolio, 30 August 2026
Energy efficiency of the EU building stock close to 75% cannot be regarded as energy efficient European Court of Auditors; Portfolio, 30 August 2026

Two rows of the table together give the core of MIAK’s argument: the annual sum devoted to housing policy may reach 1,000 billion forints, while 93 per cent of subsidised loans goes to the top five income deciles. This does not show that the sum is insufficient, but that the targeting is imprecise.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Construction affairs (programme points) — the data-based targeting of the housing construction and renovation programmes, the transparency of contractor exposure;
  • Social policy (programme points) — the housing data platform and the targeting of subsidies by wealth position as well;
  • Economy (background material) — the macroeconomic and budgetary effect of phasing out the interest subsidy.

One important legal distinction concerning the insolvency proceedings: the opening of insolvency proceedings is not liquidation, not a finding of insolvency and not a declaration of any breach of rules — the purpose of the procedure under the bankruptcy act is the restoration of solvency by way of a composition with creditors. In the contractual dispute between the state and the company group — over the lawfulness of the withdrawal from the sale of the office complex — a court decides in the event of a dispute, not the government and not the company. None of MIAK’s proposals takes a position on the question of responsibility.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

The chapter of Piketty’s book on the structure of capital records a ratio that barely appears in the Hungarian housing policy debate: in developed countries the capital stock is divided into roughly two equal parts — one half residential property, the other the working capital of companies and of the state.

“In the 2010s, in the developed countries, each inhabitant had on average an income of around 30,000 euros a year and owned wealth of around 180,000 euros, of which 90,000 euros in the form of residential property and 90,000 euros in the form of shares, bonds, savings or other investments.”

Piketty’s long-run time series also shows that the value of residential property has risen from barely a year of national income in the eighteenth century to three years today — the nature of capital has changed, land has been replaced by property, but its importance has not diminished. Translated to the Hungarian situation: housing subsidy is not a sub-question of social policy but an instrument influencing the distribution of half the national wealth. If 93 per cent of subsidised loans goes to the top five income deciles, then housing policy does not reduce but accelerates the concentration of wealth — and does so from public money. This consideration is built in by the SZ1 programme point, which prescribes not only income but also wealth position as the basis of targeting.

📖 Source: Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

6.4.2 Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics

Analysing the American housing bubble of the 2000s, Krugman formulates the basic principle most important from the point of view of the Hungarian interest subsidy situation: the safety of borrowing is decided not by the initial instalment but by the instalment payable up to maturity.

“From long experience, we knew that home buyers shouldn’t take on mortgages whose payments they couldn’t afford, and that they should put enough money down so that they can sustain a moderate drop in home prices and still have positive equity.”

Krugman singles out the risk of the jump in instalments occurring at the expiry of the preferential initial rate (the “teaser interest rate”): borrowers en masse faced a monthly burden that was still manageable during the preferential period but not afterwards. The Hungarian situation differs in this respect: here it was not lenders that offered an over-risky construction, but the state that introduced a protective measure which it is now phasing out. The structure of the consequence, however, is the same: 200 thousand households face a change in their instalment whose extent they do not know today. The practical lesson of Krugman’s analysis is not that the phase-out is wrong — but that the extent of the jump in instalments has to be calculated and communicated in advance. What can be foreseen can also be managed; what cannot becomes a systemic risk.

📖 Source: Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics

6.4.3 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

The chapter of Chang’s book that goes through the institutional conditions of economic development regards insolvency law not as a regulatory burden but as one of the conditions of development. In his enumeration, a good bankruptcy law plays the same role on the side of capital as the welfare state does on the side of workers:

“…institutions that are able to provide a second chance both to capital (a good bankruptcy law) and to workers (a functioning welfare state)…”

This frame makes two things possible in assessing the Bayer Construct case. On the one hand it rules out the reading under which the opening of insolvency proceedings is in itself an escape or an abuse — the institution of the second chance exists precisely so that a company that has faltered but is still viable does not shut down for good, dragging subcontractors and homebuyers down with it. On the other hand, it sharply raises the question of whether Hungarian regulation really fulfils this function. If — as the insolvency lawyer quoted by Portfolio warns — classifying a creditor claim as disputed effectively excludes one creditor (in this case the state) from decision-making, while the terms of the composition concluded with the other creditors apply to it as well, then the rule does not give a second chance but creates a negotiating asymmetry. This is not a question of judging the particular case but a regulatory one: MIAK’s EP4 programme point therefore calls for the publicity of state contractual exposure — the state can act as a good creditor if it knows in advance how large its exposure is.

📖 Source: Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

6.5 International comparison

The European Court of Auditors’ examination covered four member states (Belgium, Italy, Cyprus, Lithuania) with on-the-spot checks, examining 28 measures and 27 concrete projects in total. The finding that is directly relevant for Hungary as well: most of the subsidies did not go to deep renovations, the member states calculated the saving achieved with differing methodologies, and cost-effectiveness was barely examined. This is not a Hungarian peculiarity — but that is precisely why it offers an opportunity: the member state that arrives for the next cycle with a credible measurement methodology gains a negotiating advantage, because in the 2028–2034 framework payments would be tied to milestones and targets undertaken in advance.

On the rental-housing side the Viennese model is the best-known European example of the fact that a large municipal and state rental housing stock has a price-dampening effect over the long run on the whole housing market, not only for those living in rental housing. The Hungarian situation is structurally far from this — in 86 per cent of the housing stock the owner lives in the property — so MIAK’s proposal is not aimed at reaching Viennese proportions but at the substantially more modest goal that, for the property stock now returned, rental-housing use should at least be weighed, and that rejection should be justified.

Construction affairs

  • EP2 — Housing construction data platform
  • EP3 — Energy efficiency renovation programme
  • EP4 — Transparency in the construction industry

Social policy

  • SZ3 — Housing data platform
  • SZ1 — Targeted subsidies

Demography

  • DM7 — Housing access programme for young families

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

Proposed new programme point: A compulsory rental-housing utilisation balance for property assets returned to state ownership — for the Social policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 31 August 2026 — topic 3):

  • [Portfolio] Vitézy Dávid véget vetne a lakhatási válságnak: most indul a munka — https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20260830/vitezy-david-veget-vetne-a-lakhatasi-valsagnak-most-indul-a-munka-859246
  • [Portfolio] 200 ezer magyar család várja lélegzet-visszafojtva az új kormány döntését (the article was not publicly downloadable) — https://www.portfolio.hu/bank/20260814/200-ezer-magyar-csalad-varja-lelegzet-visszafojtva-az-uj-kormany-donteset-nem-tudjak-mi-lesz-ket-honap-mulva-a-hitelukkel-856122
  • [Portfolio] Megszólalt a szakjogász: olyasmi van a csődeljárás alatt álló építőipari óriás kezében, amivel a magyar államot is sarokba szoríthatja — https://www.portfolio.hu/ingatlan/20260828/megszolalt-a-szakjogasz-olyasmi-van-a-csodeljaras-alatt-allo-epitoipari-orias-kezeben-amivel-a-magyar-allamot-is-sarokba-szorithatja-858988
  • [Portfolio] A Bayer Construct csődje, és ami mögötte van: okos húzás vagy kétségbeesett védekezés? — https://www.portfolio.hu/ingatlan/20260828/a-bayer-construct-csodje-es-ami-mogotte-van-okos-huzas-vagy-ketsegbeesett-vedekezes-858740
  • [Portfolio] Ömlött az uniós pénz a lakásokra, mégsem tudni, mennyi energiát sikerült megtakarítani — https://www.portfolio.hu/unios-forrasok/20260830/omlott-az-unios-penz-a-lakasokra-megsem-tudni-mennyi-energiat-sikerult-megtakaritani-858166
  • [444.hu] Vitézy minisztériuma 100 milliárd forint értékű vagyont vesz vissza a felszámolt kekváktól — https://444.hu/2026/08/30/vitezy-miniszteriuma-100-milliard-forint-erteku-vagyont-vesz-vissza-a-felszamolt-kekvaktol
  • [Telex] Az új kormánynak mindent másképp kéne csinálnia, ha működő lakáspolitikát akar — https://telex.hu/nevertek/2026/08/31/a-lakaspolitikanak-nemcsak-az-eszkozeit-hanem-a-celjait-is-ujra-kell-gondolni
  • [HVG] Ezrek figyelik aggódva a Tisza-kormány és a Bayer Construct meccsét — https://hvg.hu/360/20260828_bayer-construct-csodeljaras-balazs-attila-magyar-peter-elszamoltatas
  • [Magyar Nemzet] Munkahelyek és lakásvásárlások kerülhetnek veszélybe a kormány döntése miatt — https://magyarnemzet.hu/gazdasag/2026/08/munkahelyek-es-lakasvasarlasok-kerulhetnek-veszelybe-a-kormany-dontese-miatt

Knowledge base references (literature):

  • 📖 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century
  • 📖 Paul Krugman: The Return of Depression Economics
  • 📖 Ha-Joon Chang: 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Construction affairs (programme points; programme point ID: EP2, EP3, EP4)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ3, SZ1)
  • MIAK policy area: Demography (programme points; programme point ID: DM7)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 31 August 2026 — topic 3, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • MNB — Financial Stability Report, June 2026
  • European Court of Auditors — report on the renovation of residential buildings financed from the recovery fund
  • KSH — housing statistics and house price index
  • Eurostat — housing cost overburden rate

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