Part I — Situation overview

On Saturday, 26 September 2026, at the Szolnok stop of his country tour, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced that the government intends to introduce the wealth tax from 1 January 2027, and on stricter terms than promised in the campaign. The law on it must be adopted by the National Assembly. According to the Prime Minister, the details will be presented by Finance Minister András Kármán. He himself said only by way of example, in the conditional, that above a certain threshold, for instance 500 billion forints, the rate could be not 1 per cent but more. According to Portfolio’s summary, Attila Kövesdy, the Ministry of Finance’s State Secretary responsible for tax policy, had already outlined the basics of the draft at a conference on 22 September. Under this, a recurring (not one-off) 1 per cent tax would apply to wealth above 1 billion forints, with the broadest possible tax base: company shareholdings, real estate, movable property, domestic and foreign assets. The draft legislation could be put out for public consultation within a few weeks. At the same forum, the Prime Minister also spoke about rebuilding the itemised tax for small taxpaying enterprises (KATA). KATA taxpayers would again be able to invoice companies, it would again be possible to use the KATA as a side job, for example alongside a pension or university studies, and as many as a hundred thousand businesses could switch to this form of taxation. In return, the monthly itemised tax would rise in one big step or two smaller ones, so that KATA taxpayers would be entitled to sick pay, maternity benefits and a regular pension.

Both topics recur in MIAK’s analyses. MIAK wrote about the progressive direction of the wealth tax in April (Tisza tax programme), about its constitutional defensibility and beneficial-ownership transparency in June (Wealth tax and budget review), and about the valuation methodology in August (A pay cap and a wealth tax in one week). A MIAK analysis on the return of the KATA and on screening out disguised employment appeared in May (András Kármán’s announcements). Two things are new now. One is that a political promise has been made on the top bracket before the draft has appeared, without any calculation. The other is that the KATA increase is explicitly justified by pension entitlement, while from 1 January 2027 the minimum old-age pension rises from 28,500 forints to 120 thousand forints (A minimum pension of 120 thousand forints). Meanwhile, according to HVG, the 2027 budget needs to raise roughly 2,500 billion forints (The 2027 budget).

MIAK’s reading: the two announcements are two sides of the same budget, yet they are treated as separate news items. The wealth tax promises revenue, while the expansion of the KATA may take away contribution and tax revenue if employees or invoicing professionals switch to it. The tougher top bracket sounds good, but its revenue effect depends on how many taxpayers fall into it and how many of them restructure their wealth. There is no public figure for this today. The pension-oriented increase of the KATA is the right direction, but it is credible only if it becomes clear what entitlement the higher monthly amount buys.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretative framework. According to the wealth-tax chapter of Capital in the Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty (French economist, leading researcher of long-term data on wealth inequality), a rate well above 2 per cent may be justified for the largest fortunes. The rate, however, must be tied to the returns actually observed in the wealth brackets, and substantial revenue requires going further down the wealth hierarchy, beyond the billionaires. Piketty also stresses that without automatic exchange of banking information, the avoidance risk of a progressive wealth tax levied in a single country is very high. The European Commission’s action plan for the European Pillar of Social Rights (The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan) warns that the line between employee and self-employed is blurring, and that the social protection of the self-employed must be extended with sustainable financing. According to the Commission’s thematic analysis of pensions (Adequacy and Sustainability of Pensions), pension entitlement must track contributions ever more closely. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first calls for a numerical foundation for the top bracket of the wealth tax even before public consultation, the second for entitlement and anti-abuse rules for the rebuilding of the KATA, and the third for a joint impact assessment of the two measures.

3.1 A bracket-by-bracket revenue and avoidance estimate as an annex to the wealth-tax draft (simultaneously with the opening of public consultation)

MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Finance put the draft legislation on the wealth tax out for public consultation together with a numerical annex. For each planned bracket (above 1 billion forints and, if there is one, in the higher top bracket), the annex should present the estimated number of taxpayers affected, the estimated tax base and the expected gross revenue. It should also contain the assumption of how much of the tax base may disappear through restructuring, relocation abroad or the search for allowances, as well as the estimated cost of collecting the tax. The rate of the top bracket should be justified not by a round number but by the observed return of the wealth bracket. According to Piketty, this is the simplest and fairest method (see 6.4.1). The annex should also provide a sensitivity table: what the revenue is if avoidance is lower or higher than estimated. The higher bracket should be accompanied by a rule against tax avoidance through relocation abroad, and by full use of international automatic exchange of financial information (CRS, the OECD standard for the automatic exchange of account information between countries). All this is a direct application of the G7 wealth-inequality monitoring and the G8 capital-income programme points. The principle of certainty under G16 means here that those affected know what to expect even before the law is adopted.

3.2 A KATA entitlement table and anti-abuse rules for invoicing companies (simultaneously with the submission of the KATA bill)

MIAK proposes that the explanatory memorandum of the KATA bill contain a public entitlement table. For each planned monthly amount, it should show how many days of service time (time counted towards the pension) and what benefit base (the income used to calculate sick pay and the pension) the KATA taxpayer acquires with it, compared with a minimum-wage employee. The table should distinguish three groups. For the full-time KATA taxpayer, full entitlement is at stake. Someone using the KATA alongside employment already has this from their main job. And someone using the KATA alongside a pension already receives a pension. The pension-oriented increase is therefore best applied primarily to full-time KATA taxpayers; a different amount may be justified for the other two groups. According to the European Commission’s pension analysis, entitlement must track contributions (see 6.4.3). With a minimum pension of 120 thousand forints, a monthly amount that is too low would mean that the difference is borne by the other contributors. With the return of invoicing to companies, disguised employment — that is, when someone who in reality works as an employee is made to invoice as an entrepreneur — is again a real risk. MIAK would therefore place the rule on the client side: if a specified share of a KATA taxpayer’s annual revenue comes from the same client, the client should pay an additional tax. The EU action plan names precisely this blurring of boundaries (see 6.4.2). The proposal builds on the SZ13 pension-adequacy and the FO11 self-sufficiency programme points.

3.3 A joint impact assessment of the wealth tax and the KATA (together with the 2027 budget bill, ex-post review within 18 months)

MIAK proposes that the Government attach a single joint impact assessment of the two measures to the 2027 budget bill. It should show the expected net revenue of the wealth tax (after deducting the cost of collection) and the expected revenue loss from the KATA expansion. The loss arises because those switching to the KATA previously paid personal income tax (PIT) and contributions. The impact assessment should also show the balance, and how the long-term liabilities of the pension system change as a result of KATA taxpayers’ new entitlements. Under the G20 impact-assessment programme point, the Government should already now fix the expected results: the number of wealth-tax payers, the revenue collected, the number of KATA taxpayers and the share of KATA revenues coming from a single client. 18 months after introduction, these should be publicly compared with the actual data. To measure the distributional effect, the wealth-inequality baseline measurement under SZ9 must be carried out before introduction; otherwise it will be impossible to measure afterwards what the tax has changed. The impact assessment can also serve as input for the Fiscal Council (the independent body that gives its opinion on the budget bill).

The common principle of the three proposals is that a tax is made credible not by its rate but by its numbers. The tougher top bracket and pensions for KATA taxpayers are both supportable aims. Behind both, however, one has to set out how much they bring in and how much they cost, before the debate on the brackets and the monthly amount begins. According to Piketty’s argument (see 6.4.1), one of the most important benefits of a wealth tax is reliable wealth statistics in itself. This advantage can be obtained most cheaply at the draft stage.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget The bracket-by-bracket estimate and the joint impact assessment give a realistic revenue plan for the 2027 budget If the estimate shows low revenue, political pressure may shift towards narrowing the brackets and allowances
Tax avoidance The rule against relocation abroad and information exchange narrow the room for avoidance The valuation of movable and unlisted assets remains contestable, which may give rise to legal disputes
Labour market The client-side additional tax curbs disguised employment A limit that is too strict may also hit genuine entrepreneurs working with one main client
Pension system The entitlement table makes transparent what the monthly amount buys With an amount that is too low, the difference up to the minimum pension is financed by the other contributors
Public life The debate shifts from slogans to numbers The uncertainty of the estimates may offer a political target, regardless of the direction of the measure

The main question to weigh is the top bracket. Above a very high threshold there are few taxpayers, so the revenue effect of a higher rate may be small, while the incentive to avoid is strongest precisely among them. According to the GKI estimate quoted by Magyar Nemzet, 1 per cent of the combined wealth of the 100 richest Hungarians would be roughly 125 billion forints. Substantial revenue therefore depends on the broader tax base, mainly unlisted company shareholdings, not on the top bracket. That is why the top bracket must be backed by numbers: if the estimate shows it brings in little, then it is primarily symbolic, and it is worth saying so openly. In the case of the KATA, the question to weigh is where to set the limit. With a limit that is too low, genuine entrepreneurs would also pay the additional tax. With a limit that is too high, disguised employment could become widespread, and this reduces the contribution revenue from which pensions are paid.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following these performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators):

  • Existence of the bracket-by-bracket annex: whether, when public consultation opens, the wealth-tax draft contains, for each bracket, the number of those affected, the tax base, the revenue and the avoidance assumption. Suggested target value: yes, on the same day as the draft.
  • Revenue hit rate: what percentage of the estimate annexed to the draft the wealth tax actually collected in 2027 amounts to. Suggested target value: at least 80 per cent, with the cost of collection below 5 per cent of revenue.
  • KATA entitlement coverage: what percentage of full-time KATA taxpayers acquire service time and a benefit base comparable to those of a minimum-wage employee. Suggested target value: publication of the entitlement table with the bill, measurement of coverage from the end of 2027.
  • Share of KATA taxpayers dependent on a single client: the share of KATA taxpayers whose annual revenue comes overwhelmingly from a single client. It is worth tracking quarterly and comparing with the pre-2022 level.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks that the wealth tax and the KATA not remain two separate announcements but become one numerical package. Together with the draft, the Ministry of Finance should publish how much the wealth tax brings in within each bracket, and how much of it may disappear through avoidance. The KATA bill should show what pension and sick pay the higher monthly amount buys. It should also ensure that invoicing to companies does not become a channel for disguised employment. And the Government should calculate the joint balance of the two measures together with the 2027 budget, and after 18 months publicly compare the promise with the result.

Two MIAK foundational values are at play here. Data-drivenness, because the top bracket is today a promise without calculation, although the tax-authority and central-bank data needed for the estimate exist. Transparency, because the acceptance of a new tax and a restructured tax type depends on whether those affected and the public can see the effects in advance. If this is missing, the debate is about slogans instead of numbers.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, HVG presented the Prime Minister’s announcement in a personal frame. Besides the wealth tax, it highlighted the barbed remark addressed to Lőrinc Mészáros and his wife, and on the KATA wrote only that the rate of the tax would rise. Telex quoted the pension and sick-pay entitlement justification of the KATA in more detail, in the Prime Minister’s words: several hundred thousand people in a country cannot be left without a pension. 444.hu gave the most detailed KATA summary: invoicing to companies, the KATA as a side job and alongside a pension, and the increase in one or two steps were all included. Népszava brought the KATA reorganisation, the wealth tax and the unannounced hospital visits together in a single summary.

In the public-affairs band, the headlines of 24.hu and Index put the egg-throwing incident first; the wealth tax and the KATA appeared in the second half of the articles. 24.hu discussed the two tax matters together with the waiting-list programme and the expansion of healthcare funding, while Index highlighted the extension of the KATA with a separate subheading.

In the economic band, Portfolio linked the Prime Minister’s announcement with the more detailed presentation given a few days earlier by the Ministry of Finance’s State Secretary for tax policy: a broad tax base, valuation rules, and taking into account the conventions on the avoidance of double taxation. A few days earlier, a Portfolio guest author, Elemér Terták, wrote that the government must take the unpopular adjustment measures as soon as possible. He also pointed out that many basic rules of tax obligations are cardinal, that is, provisions of two-thirds laws.

In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet wrote on the morning of 26 September, even before the Szolnok announcement, that the government may have miscalculated the numbers of the wealth tax. The paper disputed the revenue expectation: it quoted a GKI estimate and the views of tax advisers and interest groups, put the cost of collection at up to 15 per cent of revenue, and listed the European countries that have abolished their wealth tax. From MIAK’s point of view this framing is substantive, because it asks precisely the question that the annex proposed in point 3.1 would answer. On avoidance and revenue, both sides argue today with estimates, without an official figure. Mandiner published no fresh content on the topic that day.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Planned date of introduction of the wealth tax 1 January 2027 Péter Magyar’s announcement, Portfolio, HVG, Telex, 26 September 2026
General threshold and rate above 1 billion forints, 1% Attila Kövesdy, Ministry of Finance, Portfolio, 26 September 2026
Higher bracket floated for example above 500 billion forints, a rate higher than 1% (conditional, as an example) Péter Magyar, 444.hu, Portfolio, 26 September 2026
Planned tax base company shareholdings, real estate, movable property, domestic and foreign assets Ministry of Finance, Portfolio, 26 September 2026
Public consultation on the draft “within a few weeks” Ministry of Finance, Portfolio, 26 September 2026
Estimated wealth of the 100 richest Hungarians, 2026 12,579 billion forints (1% of it approx. 125 billion forints) GKI, Magyar Nemzet, 26 September 2026
Estimated value of unlisted company shareholdings some 40 thousand billion forints GKI based on MNB statistics, Magyar Nemzet, 26 September 2026
Wealth-tax revenue estimates in the press 300–600 billion; “most optimistic” 300 billion gross; “realistically” 100–180 billion forints a year Magyar Nemzet (Balázs Horváth, Hajnalka Csorbai), 26 September 2026
KATA: expected switchers as many as a hundred thousand Péter Magyar, Portfolio, 444.hu, 26 September 2026
KATA: planned changes invoicing to companies, KATA as a side job, increase of the monthly amount in one or two steps, increase of the annual revenue limit Péter Magyar, 444.hu, Index, Portfolio, 26 September 2026
Minimum old-age pension from 1 January 2027 from 28,500 forints to 120 thousand forints Péter Magyar’s announcement, 27 August 2026 (MIAK analysis, 28 August 2026)
Estimated funding need of the 2027 budget roughly 2,500 billion forints HVG, 21 September 2026 (MIAK analysis, 24 September 2026)

Two remarks belong to the figures. First, the revenue estimates circulating in the press differ by orders of magnitude, and none of them is official. This in itself argues for the bracket-by-bracket annex proposed in point 3.1. Second, the level and threshold of the top bracket were mentioned only as an example, in the conditional, so no decision has yet been made on them.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points and background material) — progressive tax reform, wealth-inequality monitoring, taxation of capital income, the tax principles of certainty and cost of collection, and the mandatory ex-post impact assessment (programme point ID: G3, G7, G8, G16, G20);
  • Social policy (programme points) — inheritance tax, public measurement of wealth inequality and pension adequacy, which is directly affected by the entitlement rules of the KATA (programme point ID: SZ5, SZ9, SZ13);
  • Employment policy and labour market (programme points) — self-sufficiency incentives; the KATA serves self-sufficiency if the KATA taxpayer is a genuine entrepreneur and their payments also create entitlements (programme point ID: FO11).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century

In Chapter 15 of the book, Piketty argues for a permanent, annual, progressive wealth tax. He distinguishes the inheritance tax, paid once per generation, which can work even at a high rate, from the annual wealth tax, whose rate can be only a few per cent. According to his European illustrative calculation, a tax of 1 per cent on wealth between 1 and 5 million euros and 2 per cent above that would affect roughly 2.5 per cent of the population and would bring in revenue equivalent to some 2 per cent of GDP. On the top bracket, he writes that there is no reason to stop the rate at 2 per cent. Since the real return on the largest fortunes is 6–7 per cent or more, a much higher rate may be justified for wealth above 100 million or 1 billion euros. The simplest and fairest approach is to adjust the rate to the returns observed in the given wealth bracket in previous years. Piketty, however, also issues two warnings. First, substantial revenue requires going further down the wealth hierarchy, to the level of fortunes of tens and hundreds of millions of euros, because billionaires are few in number. Second, without automatic exchange of banking information, the risk of avoidance is very high for a progressive wealth tax levied by a single country. That is why countries grant many exemptions, especially for business assets, which hollow out the tax. He also gives an Italian example: the wealth tax introduced in 2012, which because of capital flight was low and did not extend to listed shares, proved regressive in practice. According to Piketty, one of the main benefits of an annual wealth tax is reliable wealth statistics supplied under a legal obligation, without which the debate on the wealth tax is also conducted blindly. For the Hungarian top bracket, this means that a higher rate can be justified, but only together with a calculation based on the bracket’s returns and with anti-avoidance rules. And the lion’s share of the revenue comes not from the top bracket but from the broad tax base. (Because of the volume’s legal status, it appears here only in paraphrase.)

📖 Source: Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Chapter 15: A Global Tax on Capital)

6.4.2 European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan

The 2021 action plan for the European Pillar of Social Rights describes, as one of the new phenomena of the world of work, the blurring of the boundary between traditional employee and self-employed status. The document puts it this way:

“Another important emerging trend is the blurring of traditional boundaries between workers and self-employed, and the increasing heterogeneity within the group of self-employed.”

According to the plan, Member States can improve the social protection of the unemployed, those in non-standard employment and the self-employed through structural reforms that also ensure the sustainable financing of this protection. Principle 12 of the Pillar states that workers and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed have the right to adequate social protection. Two conclusions follow for the rebuilding of the Hungarian KATA. Creating entitlement to sick pay, maternity benefits and a pension is in line with the EU direction, but the financing must be sustainable, so the price of entitlement cannot be symbolic. And the return of invoicing to companies reopens precisely the blurring of boundaries that the plan warns about. That is why MIAK proposes the client-side additional tax in point 3.2.

📖 Source: European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (2021)

6.4.3 European Commission: Adequacy and Sustainability of Pensions

The Commission’s pension analysis, prepared within the European Semester, starts from Principle 15 of the European Pillar of Social Rights, under which workers and the self-employed alike have the right to a pension commensurate with their contributions and ensuring an adequate income. According to the analysis, because of population ageing and the shrinking working-age population, spending growth may become unsustainable, so entitlement must track contributions more closely:

“Entitlements should more closely reflect contributions and be calculated on an actuarial basis.”

The analysis also warns that a shorter or interrupted contribution career significantly reduces the replacement rate of the future pension (the ratio of the pension to previous earnings). At the same time, it also states that those who cannot meet longer contribution requirements must be protected by a minimum pension or other minimum income. For the KATA, it follows that increasing the monthly amount achieves its aim if the KATA taxpayer’s payment creates a proportionate entitlement. If the payment remains low, the difference is borne by the other contributors to the pension system, through the minimum pension raised to 120 thousand forints from 2027. That is why MIAK asks for the entitlement table in point 3.2, and for the calculation of the long-term liabilities of the pension system in point 3.3.

📖 Source: European Commission: European Semester Thematic Factsheet — Adequacy and Sustainability of Pensions

6.5 International comparison

According to Magyar Nemzet, in Europe today only Spain, Norway and Switzerland have a classical wealth tax, and several countries have abolished it. The paper concludes from this that the wealth tax is not a success story. Piketty interprets the same experience differently (see 6.4.1). In his view, the weak revenue of European wealth taxes stemmed largely from the fact that exemptions covering business assets and large company shareholdings hollowed out the tax base, because without information exchange countries feared capital flight. The Italian wealth tax of 2012 is an extreme example of this: because of low rates differing by asset class, the largest fortunes, consisting mainly of financial assets, paid proportionally less. MIAK’s economic programme point (G8) cites the Norwegian 1.1 per cent wealth tax as a workable example within the European Economic Area. The common lesson of the two interpretations for the Hungarian draft is that the broad tax base promised by the Ministry of Finance is the right direction. Success depends on whether the range of exemptions remains narrow, and whether the tax authority has access to data on foreign assets. The rate of the top bracket is a secondary question by comparison.

Economy

  • G3 — Simplification of the tax system and progressive reform
  • G7 — Wealth-inequality monitoring
  • G8 — Progressive taxation of capital income
  • G16 — Algorithmising Smith’s principles of taxation
  • G20 — Economic-policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)

Social policy

  • SZ5 — Inheritance tax reform
  • SZ9 — Public monitoring of wealth inequality
  • SZ13 — Pension adequacy and sustainability

Employment policy and labour market

  • FO11 — Self-sufficiency incentives — preventing welfare dependency

Proposed new programme point: KATA entitlement table and client-side additional tax — a public service-time and benefit-base table for every monthly amount of the itemised small-business tax, and an additional client-side burden for KATA relationships dependent on a single client — for the Employment policy and labour market area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 27 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge base references (books):

  • 📖 Thomas Piketty: Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014)
  • 📖 European Commission: The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan (2021)
  • 📖 European Commission: European Semester Thematic Factsheet — Adequacy and Sustainability of Pensions

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G3, G7, G8, G16, G20)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material — global capital tax and international coordination)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ5, SZ9, SZ13)
  • MIAK policy area: Employment policy and labour market (programme points; programme point ID: FO11)
  • MIAK press monitor, 27 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • GKI — estimate of the wealth of the 100 richest Hungarians (as reported by Magyar Nemzet)
  • MNB — financial accounts, value of unlisted company shareholdings (via GKI’s estimate, as reported by Magyar Nemzet)

Generation metadata