Part I — Situation overview

On 28 September 2026, at an extraordinary sitting, the National Assembly suspended the parliamentary immunity of former Minister for Culture and Innovation Balázs Hankó (Fidesz), former Minister of National Development Miklós Seszták (KDNP) and Prime Minister Péter Magyar, in each case by 139 votes in favour, with no votes against and no abstentions. Only MPs of Tisza and Mi Hazánk took part in the sitting. At the morning meeting of the Immunity Committee no supporting decision was reached in any of the cases (in Hankó’s case, for example, only three members voted for suspension and the others did not vote), so the committee formally recommended maintaining the immunities. The suspicion in Hankó’s case is breach of trust connected with the pre-election distribution of funds by the National Cultural Fund (NKA); in Seszták’s case, bribery of officials linked to the Volánbusz contracts and bus procurements; and in the Prime Minister’s case, a mobile phone taken during a night-time incident in 2024 and thrown into the Danube. At the same sitting, in a secret ballot, Prosecutor General nominee Zoltán Szathmáry was defeated with 0 votes in favour, 138 against and 1 abstention. His election would have required the votes of two-thirds of all MPs, that is, at least 133 members of the 199-seat National Assembly. After the decision Miklós Seszták voluntarily reported to the Central Chief Prosecutor’s Office of Investigation, where he was taken into custody. Balázs Hankó, by contrast, stayed for hours with his family in the parliamentary office of the Fidesz group. In the evening Speaker Ágnes Forsthoffer called on him in writing to leave the building, and at 7:20 pm the summons also arrived. Hankó was then taken into custody in the Budapest building of the Criminal Directorate General of the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) — where he had been summoned — and then transported to Kecskemét, because the investigation in his case is directed by the Bács-Kiskun County Chief Prosecutor’s Office.

The background is known: on 22 September Deputy Prosecutor General István Lajtár, acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General, requested the suspension of all three immunities on a single day. In its analysis of 23 September MIAK made a proposal on the standard of reasoning for such motions. The office of Prosecutor General has been vacant since Gábor Bálint Nagy resigned in July; President of the Republic András Baka nominated Szathmáry on 21 September. The Tisza group had already signalled the previous week that it would not support him, according to press reports because the nominee’s brother is implicated in the so-called gold convoy case. After the vote the head of state said that he regards the decision as the functioning of democracy, that he will put forward a new nominee as soon as possible, and that he will not initiate political consultations in the future either.

MIAK’s reading: Monday made visible three points that today are filled not by a rule fixed in advance but by the decisions of whoever is involved on the day. It is not clearly regulated what happens within the walls of Parliament House to an MP whose immunity has been lifted; there is no public accounting procedure for who makes strategic decisions in a prosecution service without a head, and how; and the public today learns of the grounds for coercive measures from the suspect’s defence counsel and from political actors, not from the authority. These gaps can affect either side of politics — which is why the rule is worth fixing now, independently of the concrete cases.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the framework for interpreting the situation. Joseph Raz (Israeli–British legal philosopher, Oxford professor, one of the defining authors of the formal conception of the rule of law) writes in The Authority of Law that one of the most important principles of the rule of law is that particular official decisions must be guided by open, known-in-advance and relatively stable general rules. This is exactly what was missing in the hours after the lifting of immunity. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American lawyer and economist, professor at Yale University, classical author of the political economy of corruption) states in Corruption and Government that an independent prosecuting authority is a condition of action against corruption, but is not enough in itself: the independent institution must itself also be accountable. In the case of a prosecution service without an elected head this is a particularly sharp question. The Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights (compliance with which is monitored by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg — this is not an EU court) provides two yardsticks: a person deprived of liberty must be informed promptly of the reasons, and everyone must be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. None of them takes a position on the guilt of the suspects, and none of them interferes in ongoing proceedings: all three fill procedural gaps in the phase following the lifting of immunity, and would apply equally to an MP of today’s governing party and to an opposition MP.

3.1 A non-partisan Parliament House protocol for the hours after the lifting of immunity (Speaker’s regulation within 30 days, statutory codification by 31 December 2026)

In her Monday evening letter the Speaker referred to the Act on the National Assembly: in such a situation the Parliamentary Guard may not bring anyone in, nor may it hand anyone over to the investigating authority at the request of another authority; the Act limits the guard’s power of arrest to cases of being caught in the act. The purpose of the rule is understandable — the parliament building must not become an arena for the executive — but its consequence was that an MP whose immunity had been lifted could decide for himself, for hours, when to leave the building. MIAK proposes that the Speaker — who under the Act herself regulates the rules of entry into and presence in the building — publish within 30 days a post-lifting protocol: (1) simultaneously with the promulgation of the resolution suspending immunity, the investigating authority informs the MP and the Speaker in writing of the place and time of the planned procedural act; (2) from that point the MP may remain in the building for no more than a specified period — for example until the end of the plenary or committee sitting day — and the group office is no exception; (3) if the deadline passes, the investigating authority may act with the Speaker’s written authorisation under conditions published in advance, in the presence of the Parliamentary Guard, in a space separate from the chamber. The protocol protects against two situations at once: the MP does not have to leave their workplace in a humiliating manner, and the authority does not have to wait for hours. Since, under Article 4 of the Fundamental Law, the detailed rules on the legal status of MPs belong in a cardinal act, statutory codification requires two-thirds of the MPs present. This in itself ensures that the rule does not depend on the will of a single majority. The proposal follows the constitutional stress-test logic of I10, and builds on Raz’s rule-of-law principle (see 6.4.1): the handling of the individual case should be guided by a general rule announced in advance.

3.2 An accountable prosecutorial transition, a deadlock rule and a mandatory hearing of nominees (monthly register immediately, amendment of the law and the Rules of Procedure by 30 November 2026)

The office of Prosecutor General has been vacant since July, and according to press reports one of the deputies is no longer in office, while the other turns 65 in December, which ends his service relationship. Meanwhile it is the deputy acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General who submits the immunity motions, and the leadership of the prosecution service also decides which prosecutor’s office should handle politically sensitive cases. One such case now was the transfer of criminal complaints based on the allegations of former chief prosecutor Pál Fürcht and on the gold convoy case to the Szeged Regional Investigating Prosecutor’s Office. These may be lawful steps, but under Article 29 of the Fundamental Law it is the elected Prosecutor General who reports annually to the National Assembly; there is no such regular accountability for the interim leadership. MIAK proposes three steps. First: the deputy acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General should publish monthly a short register of the decisions taken in that capacity — immunity motions, case transfers, designations — without releasing investigation data. Second: by 30 November the National Assembly should adopt, in the cardinal Act on the Prosecution Service, a deadlock rule for the case where neither a Prosecutor General nor a deputy is in office. The rule should designate, according to a ranking fixed in advance, an acting head with limited powers, whose mandate ends automatically upon the election of the new Prosecutor General. Third: according to András Baka, a personal hearing of the nominee would have been justified, but none of the parliamentary groups requested one, and Tisza did not give detailed reasons for its rejection. MIAK already proposed a public hearing in its July analysis. Now it asks that this should not depend on the discretion of the groups: the Rules of Procedure should require the nominee to take part in a public committee hearing within 15 days of the nomination. Before that, the nominee should make a written declaration of interests on whether a close relative is involved in pending criminal proceedings and, if so, how they would recuse themselves from supervising the case. In this way a question like the present one reaches MPs as a public recusal plan, not as a press report. According to Rose-Ackerman’s proposition (see 6.4.2), independence is necessary but not sufficient — the interim leadership and the nomination procedure must also be accountable. The proposal does not affect the President of the Republic’s power of nomination: nomination is an independent power of the head of state, and election is that of the National Assembly.

In its analysis of 18 September MIAK already proposed that the court publish a public summary of reasons for its decision on pre-trial detention, and that the Government adopt a written rule on statements concerning pending criminal cases. Monday revealed a gap at an earlier stage: custody is decided not by the court but by the investigating authority or the prosecution service, and in the time before the suspect is brought before a judge the public learns only from defence counsel and political actors. Under the Criminal Procedure Act, custody lasts at most 72 hours and may be ordered if it is likely that a coercive measure subject to judicial authorisation — pre-trial detention or criminal supervision — will have to be applied to the suspect. On Monday both former ministers appeared voluntarily; Hankó’s defence counsel called the taking into custody “illogical”, while the Office of the Prosecutor General and the competent chief prosecutor’s office gave no information on the ongoing procedural act. MIAK proposes that in the cases of MPs stripped of immunity the prosecution service publish within 72 hours a short, uniform statement: on which statutory ground custody was ordered, whether it is moving for a coercive measure subject to judicial authorisation and, if so, when the court will decide on it. The statement should not describe the evidence, and should consistently use the term “suspect”. The proposal follows the yardstick of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (see 6.4.3), and extends the transparency logic of the I1 programme point to the phase before a suspect is brought before a judge.

The common principle of the three proposals is that the credibility of accountability comes not from the spectacular events of the day but from a procedure known in advance. In Raz’s conception (see 6.4.1) the rule of law does not guarantee the correctness of individual decisions, but that the exercise of power is predictable in advance — and this yardstick binds today’s majority and every future opposition alike.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
National Assembly The situation after the lifting of immunity becomes predictable; the Speaker does not have to decide by an ad hoc letter calling on someone to leave the building An overly strict protocol may also restrict MPs’ work; if the conditions are set unilaterally by the majority, the opposition may rightly regard it as a political tool
Justice system The decisions of the interim leadership of the prosecution service become traceable; the deadlock rule rules out the prosecution service being left without a head The monthly register may also reveal tactical details of investigations if the disclosure boundary is not drawn precisely; the deadlock rule may reduce the pressure to elect a new Prosecutor General quickly
Society and public trust The 72-hour statement makes both the “show trial” and the “guilty” narratives verifiable against facts An official statement may itself be stigmatising if the terminology is not consistent; the distinction between suspects and non-suspect actors may become blurred

The main question to weigh for the protocol is who sets the conditions. If the rule is written by the Speaker of whatever majority alone, the protocol itself becomes the subject of dispute. MIAK therefore proposes that statutory codification take place at cardinal level, that is, with two-thirds of the MPs present, and that the Speaker’s regulation be prepared with the prior opinion of the House Committee. For the deadlock rule the risk is that the acting head becomes permanent; this is addressed by the limited powers (for example a ban on appointing new chief prosecutors and on reorganising the prosecution service) and by automatic termination. The 72-hour statement tips over to the risk side if the reasoning expands into a substantive description of evidence — the proposal is therefore expressly limited to communicating the legal ground and the procedural step.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following the performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below:

  • Protocol promulgation: publication of the Speaker’s post-lifting protocol by 29 October 2026, and its statutory codification by 31 December 2026. It is also worth following in how many cases it had to be applied, and whether there were deviations from it.
  • Vacancy period: how many days the office of Prosecutor General remains without an elected head. Suggested target: election of a new Prosecutor General before 30 November 2026, before the circle of deputies empties.
  • Interim accountability: the publication rate of the monthly registers of decisions taken with the powers of the Prosecutor General. Suggested target: 100%, with the first register by the end of October 2026.
  • 72-hour disclosure rate: for what percentage of the custody orders in cases of MPs stripped of immunity a prosecution statement on the legal ground and on the motion for a coercive measure subject to judicial authorisation appears within 72 hours. Suggested target: 100% from the first half of 2027; as a supplementary indicator it is worth following what percentage of the motions for pre-trial detention submitted in such cases the court grants.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request: after the lifting of immunity, what happens to the MP, who leads the prosecuting authority, and what the public knows about the grounds for deprivation of liberty should not be decided by the political situation of the day. This requires three rules fixed in advance: a non-partisan Parliament House protocol, an accountable prosecutorial transition with a deadlock rule and a mandatory hearing of nominees, and a uniform 72-hour disclosure standard for coercive measures. None of them slows down accountability, and none of them shields anyone from proceedings.

The proposal touches two MIAK foundational values. Accountability, because the interim leadership of the prosecution service and decisions on coercive measures are today taken in a way that makes them hard to hold to account afterwards; the monthly register and the 72-hour statement make this possible. Ideology-free politics, because on Monday both sides pronounced ready-made verdicts: the government side spoke of the acceleration of the “Road to prison programme”, the opposition of “arbitrariness” and “show trials”. Both framings burden the presumption of innocence, only from opposite directions. MIAK already proposed a rule on statements for the Government on 18 September; the same discipline can rightly be expected from the spokespersons of the opposition groups too. A rule fixed in advance is the only yardstick that binds both sides equally.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band the emphasis was on detailing the facts and figures. 444.hu published, in a separate article, the itemised amounts of the motion against Seszták based on the remarks of an Immunity Committee member, and in another the background to the rejection of the Prosecutor General nominee, highlighting that the Office of the Prosecutor General may be left without a head by December. Telex carried the Speaker’s letter in detail — in a “the nation’s house cannot be a hiding place” framing — and, in another article, the course of Hankó’s taking into custody, together with the criticism of his defence counsel. Népszava, citing the Fidesz-aligned Hír TV, reported that Hankó’s former state secretary had also been questioned as a suspect, and quoted the former state secretary for health’s claim about a “show trial”. Alongside its summary of the day, HVG examined in a subscriber-only analysis what awaits the Prime Minister without immunity (the article was not publicly downloadable, only its lead).

In the mainstream band 24.hu provided the fullest factual material on the votes and on the prosecution service’s statements, and in a separate article asked what the authorities can do if an MP refuses to leave parliament (the article was not publicly downloadable, only its lead). The outlet also quoted the head of state’s reaction in detail, including his criticism that the parliamentary groups did not hear the nominee. Index highlighted, in an ironic tone, that the post expressing solidarity with Hankó on the social media page of the chairman of Fidesz appeared while the former Prime Minister was watching the national team’s match in Belfast. In another article it discussed the designation of Szeged in the gold convoy case. ATV, alongside the defence counsel’s statement, also reported the Fidesz and KDNP group leaders’ claim of a “political witch-hunt” and the Prime Minister’s mocking reaction. In the economic band Portfolio, in a factual, quotation-based form, highlighted the head of state’s statement: the next Prosecutor General must serve the law, not the expectations of the government, the opposition or the head of state.

In the conservative band close to the former governing parties Magyar Nemzet put at the centre the message of the chairman of Fidesz, according to which “the Tisza despots” will not break the community of the national side; the outlet’s related pieces emphasised the human side of the Hankó family’s farewell. The article did not unpack the details of the legal facts — the content of the suspicion, the amounts — and the emphasis was on the framing of political persecution. At Mandiner we found no fresh article on the topic on that day.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Suspension of immunity (Hankó, Seszták, Magyar — all three) 139 in favour, 0 against, 0 abstentions National Assembly, 28 September 2026 (24.hu, 444.hu)
Position of the Immunity Committee In Hankó’s case 3 in favour, the other members did not vote; no supporting decision in any of the cases — formally it recommended maintaining the immunities Immunity Committee of the National Assembly, 28 September 2026 (444.hu, 24.hu)
Prosecutor General nominee Zoltán Szathmáry (secret ballot) 0 in favour, 138 against, 1 abstention National Assembly, 28 September 2026 (444.hu)
Votes required for election two-thirds of all MPs: at least 133 Fundamental Law, Article 29(4); 199-seat National Assembly
Date of nomination 21 September 2026 24.hu
Balázs Hankó’s case (according to the suspicion) HUF 17.3 billion in financial loss, 1,079 grant decisions, 3 September 2025 – 30 March 2026 Prosecution statement (Telex, 444.hu)
Miklós Seszták’s case (according to the motion) a total of HUF 12.6 billion in unlawful advantage, of which HUF 7.076 billion in connection with the Volánbusz contracts (May 2015 – July 2018) Presentation at the Immunity Committee (444.hu)
Upper limit of custody 72 hours, until the decision on the coercive measure subject to judicial authorisation Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure

Four provisions are relevant as the public-law framework. Under Article 4 of the Fundamental Law, MPs enjoy parliamentary immunity, and the detailed rules of their legal status are laid down in a cardinal act. Under Article 29 the prosecution service is an independent constitutional body — it is not part of the judiciary, which is the branch of power of the courts. The Prosecutor General is elected by the National Assembly for nine years on the proposal of the President of the Republic, and the Prosecutor General reports annually to the National Assembly. Under the Criminal Procedure Act, a coercive measure may be applied to a person enjoying immunity only after the suspension of immunity, and no one may be considered guilty until this has been established by a final court decision. The Act on the National Assembly limits the Parliamentary Guard’s power of arrest to cases of being caught in the act, and the rules of entry into and presence in the building are regulated by the Speaker.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the constitutional stress test, the transparency of court decisions and legislative impact assessment, in the preparation of amendments to cardinal acts (programme point ID: I10, I1, I3);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — making checks and balances measurable, the prosecution service as a measured institution (programme point ID: A6);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — the accountability and internal oversight of investigating authorities’ action in high-profile cases (programme point ID: KB6, KB7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

Raz interprets the rule of law as a formal principle: he does not ask of the law that every decision be just, but that people know in advance what to orient themselves by. He acknowledges that a legal system cannot function without particular decisions — official orders, permits, measures — but these too must be given a framework. In his key sentence:

“the making of particular laws should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules”

The author also adds that a government subject to the rule of law may not change the law retroactively, abruptly or secretly whenever this suits its purposes. Applied to Monday’s situation in Parliament House: the Speaker’s call, the waiting around the group office and the summons arriving in the evening were all particular decisions that were not guided by a general rule announced in advance. Proposal 3.1 supplies exactly this missing general rule, before the roles are reversed in the next case.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Analysing the tools for limiting power, Rose-Ackerman takes the view that independent prosecutorial and judicial institutions are the least problematic elements of anti-corruption action — but only if they themselves are free from corruption and from party-political appointments. She sums up her proposition in a single sentence:

“Independence is necessary but not sufficient.”

Elsewhere the author adds that in many countries model anti-corruption laws remain ineffective if the functioning of the prosecuting authority and the courts is not credible. In the present Hungarian situation this means that the independence of the prosecution service — which the head of state also emphasised — does not replace accountability: for the strategic decisions of an organisation operating under interim leadership without an elected head, accountability must be organised separately. The monthly register and the deadlock rule of proposal 3.2 fill this gap.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights

Article 5 of the Convention protects the right to liberty: deprivation of liberty is possible only in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and an arrested person must be informed promptly of the reasons and then brought promptly before a judge. Article 6(2) establishes the presumption of innocence:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”

The Convention thus provides a yardstick in two directions. The authority must communicate why it has deprived someone of their liberty — today the suspect learns this himself, but the public learns of it only from the statements of the defence counsel and politicians. At the same time, the communication must not turn into a prejudgment. The 72-hour statement of proposal 3.3 is therefore limited to the legal ground and the procedural step, and expressly prescribes the use of the term “suspect”. This yardstick applies equally to the government side’s “to prison” rhetoric and to the opposition’s “show trial” claim.

📖 Source: Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 5 and 6)

6.5 International comparison

The 2014 report on parliamentary immunity of the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, states that the procedural principles of transparency, legal certainty, predictability and impartiality govern the lifting of parliamentary immunity. Citing the experience of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the report finds that in about half of the 49 countries examined there were either no rules at all on the conditions and procedure for lifting immunity, or these were clearly insufficient. GRECO therefore consistently recommends the adoption of specific, clear and objective rules, with deadlines and a duty to give reasons. The report also shows that several Western European countries have narrowed the scope of parliamentary immunity: Italy in 1993 and France in 1995, by constitutional amendment, made it possible to bring criminal proceedings against MPs without the prior consent of parliament, and the French rule essentially narrowed protection to immunity from arrest. The proposal to narrow immunity that has come up in the Hungarian debate is therefore not without precedent. International experience, however, shows that alongside narrowing, detailed rules fixed in advance for the procedure after the lifting of immunity are also needed. Monday was the practical test of this.

Justice

  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”
  • I1 — Judicial transparency
  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcing checks and balances

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB6 — Police code of ethics and accountability
  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Proposed new programme point: Procedure after the lifting of parliamentary immunity and a disclosure standard for coercive measures — for the Justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Council of Europe: European Convention on Human Rights
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary (Articles 4 and 29)
  • 📖 Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I10, I1, I3)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB6, KB7)
  • MIAK press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100
  • MIAK press monitors, 24, 25 and 28 September 2026 — earlier topics on the immunity cases and the election of the Prosecutor General (background)

Supplementary public data sources:

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