Part I — Situation overview

On Thursday, 15 October 2026, the two-day meeting of the European Council begins in Brussels. The European Council is the body of the EU heads of state and government. According to HVG, the agenda includes competitiveness and energy prices, China, migration, support for Ukraine and enlargement. The biggest stake is the 2028–2034 multiannual financial framework, that is, the Union’s seven-year budget (MFF by its English abbreviation). The leaders will discuss on Thursday afternoon the negotiating document sent out by the Irish rotating presidency on 10 October, which EU jargon calls the “nego-box”. According to Portfolio, the proposal is 141 billion euros, some 8 per cent, less than the Commission’s original plan; it cuts mainly from the centrally managed programmes and tries to protect the agricultural and cohesion envelopes. According to Telex, at his Wednesday press conference in Brussels Prime Minister Péter Magyar said that the amount offered to Hungary has not decreased and the contribution obligation is not increasing. According to Portfolio and 444.hu, the Hungarian envelope has grown by some 1 billion euros compared with the earlier draft of the Cypriot presidency.

The prime minister announced two further demands. The first is compensation. According to Portfolio, some 2.1 billion euros of the cohesion commitments suspended in the 2021–2027 cycle was lost for good because the deadlines of the so-called N+2 rule expired. Under this rule, EU funds committed for a given year must be used by the end of the second following year at the latest, otherwise they are lost. Magyar acknowledged that under the current legal framework this cannot be reclaimed directly, but in the next framework he would like a surplus of up to two billion euros or project financing. The second is the migration fine. In June 2024 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) imposed a lump sum of 200 million euros and a daily penalty payment of 1 million euros, because the previous government had not implemented an earlier judgment on the asylum procedure. According to Portfolio, together with late-payment interest this already amounts to some 1 billion euros. And on Friday morning, according to Telex, Péter Magyar will hold his first official talks with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, after the Ukrainian parliament on Monday adopted the law on education in minority languages. According to Index, the meeting will last about 15 minutes.

On 9 October MIAK discussed the impact sheet for the negotiating package and the inflation correction, on 14 October the control minimum, and on 13 October it proposed measuring the implementation of the Transcarpathian education law. Today’s new facts are: the compensation claim, the negotiations on closing the fine, the summit-level Hungarian–Ukrainian meeting, and the loosening of the December deadline. In MIAK’s reading, the three Hungarian issues are three questions of different nature. The budget is a political bargain, the fine is a legal obligation, and minority rights are a question of implementation. If the government mixes these into one package, all three are weakened.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Two rules of the EU founding treaties define today’s room for manoeuvre. Under Article 312 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Council adopts the multiannual financial framework unanimously. Under its Article 260, the penalty payment is tied to non-compliance with a CJEU judgment, so its legal basis ends with compliance, not with negotiation. In the Kissinger chapter of the volume Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger, British diplomatic historian T. G. Otte describes how Henry Kissinger, former US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, regarded summits merely as a tool. In his view, a summit should deal with concrete issues, and decisions should be worked out in detail in advance, at a lower level. In the chapter on summits of a diplomacy textbook edited by Valentin Naumescu and Diana-Nicoleta Petruț and published in Cluj-Napoca, Dan Petrica distinguishes the regularly recurring summit, such as the European Council, from the short, bilateral, high-level exchange of views. Together the three sources say: today’s summit is not the last chance, and Friday’s 15 minutes are suitable for confirmation, not for bargaining. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first concerns the additional budget request, the second the migration fine, and the third Friday’s Hungarian–Ukrainian meeting. MIAK maintains its earlier proposals (impact sheet, inflation correction, control minimum, school-by-school implementation statement) and does not repeat them here.

3.1 A quantified, needs-based additional request instead of a compensation argument (with the post-summit report, by 23 October at the latest)

According to Index, the other member states are unlikely to accept the compensation argument, because each of them would increase its own envelope. Moreover, the loss stemmed from Hungarian failure, so in the eyes of the net contributors it can hardly be passed on to others. An argument built on need is stronger. According to Portfolio, based on a report of the European Committee of the Regions, the vulnerability index has worsened in all eight of Hungary’s NUTS 2 regions. According to Eurostat’s projection, a population loss of more than ten per cent is expected in most counties by 2050. Raffaele Fitto, Executive Vice-President of the Commission, has promised a separate strategy on the right to stay by early 2027. MIAK proposes that the Government publish a short report within one week after the summit. It should contain four pieces of information. First: the Hungarian national envelope in the Commission, the Cypriot and the Irish proposal, at constant and at current prices. Second: the amount and form of the requested surplus (an increase of the envelope or project financing). Third: the justification of the surplus region by region, with vulnerability and population indicators, not with the past loss. Fourth: which Hungarian objectives made it into the summit conclusions and which did not. The surplus should be targeted at the most disadvantaged districts, in line with the data-based allocation of TE2, and with a repayment rule if the target indicators are missed, in line with A8. The report follows the principle of radical transparency of G19. According to Otte’s Kissinger chapter (see 6.4.2), the substance of a summit comes from preparation and concrete detail, not from the atmosphere. The report makes this verifiable.

3.2 Closing the migration fine by complying with the judgment, not by bargaining (a bill in parallel with the 2027 budget, monthly publication of the accumulating amount immediately)

According to Portfolio, Péter Magyar is negotiating on the fine with the European Commission and the member states. He also attaches importance to the possibility that the summit conclusions may state for the first time that migration can be used for political pressure not only by states but also by people-smuggling networks. Under Article 260 TFEU (see 6.4.1), however, the penalty payment is tied to non-compliance with the judgment. According to Portfolio’s summary, the judgment requires that asylum applications can also be submitted on Hungarian territory, and it does not require anyone to be admitted. Applications may be rejected. MIAK proposes that the Government submit to the National Assembly an asylum bill that meets the requirements of the judgment. Once the National Assembly has adopted the law, the Government should ask the Commission for an official finding of compliance. Closing the fine should not become part of the budget bargain and should not depend on the wording of the conclusions. The Government should publish the accumulating amount every month, and the 2027 budget bill, which according to Portfolio may go before the National Assembly on 19 or 20 October, should show the expected deduction. The proposal follows the principled pragmatism of KP4: border protection and a lawful asylum procedure are not mutually exclusive, as Péter Magyar himself has said. In June MIAK already proposed stopping the fine with a predictable legislative timetable. Four months later, the daily amount is still running.

3.3 A written joint statement with deadlines on Friday’s Zelenskyy meeting, a public review before the Berehove meeting (the statement within 72 hours, the review at least two weeks before the Berehove meeting)

According to HVG, Péter Magyar expects Zelenskyy to confirm that Ukraine will deliver on time the ten-point political agreement already concluded at expert level. The next steps are language-use, administrative and political rights. If the meeting goes well, according to 444.hu another meeting may follow in the autumn in Berehove (Beregszász). The ten points of the agreement do not appear in the articles processed. Under Petrica’s typology (see 6.4.3), a 15-minute meeting is a high-level exchange of views, suitable for strengthening relations, not for detailed negotiation. MIAK therefore proposes that the two sides issue a written joint statement within 72 hours. It should record that Ukraine has confirmed the ten-point agreement, and name the deadline for delivery point by point. The Government should make the text of the agreement public. And at least two weeks before the Berehove meeting it should publish an interim review: which points have been delivered, which are slipping, and what the next deadline is. The next stage, on language-use and administrative rights, should be prepared at a lower level, so that only confirmation remains for Berehove. This is the principle of KP15 preventive diplomacy. On measuring implementation in schools, MIAK’s proposals of 13 October apply. This proposal makes the summit-level commitment accountable. Under Article 49 TEU, an acceding state must respect the values of Article 2, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The Hungarian–Ukrainian roadmap is thus also part of the accession process, not just a bilateral matter.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the summit confirms; it does not replace preparation. Compensation is not provided for by law, so the claim can only be strong with numbers. The fine is tied by the treaty to compliance, so it is closed by implementing the judgment. And minority rights are made accountable by deadlines. In all three cases, the Hungarian interest is that the commitment and the result can be written down and verified.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget and EU funds The needs-based justification of the additional request can also win support within the Friends of Cohesion group; the post-summit report also helps plan the 2027 budget Publicity of the numerical target may reduce negotiating room, and a surplus that fails to materialise may appear as a domestic political failure
Rule of law and asylum The 1 million euro daily burden ends through a predictable legal route, and a later government cannot reopen it as a bargain The asylum bill may open a domestic political debate, and the Commission’s finding of compliance may take months while the fine keeps running
Foreign policy and EU relations Separating the issues strengthens Hungarian credibility: the fine will not become the bargaining chip of the budget deal The net contributors may link the cohesion surplus to the fine, even if the Government handles them separately
Minority policy and Hungarian–Ukrainian relations The written statement and the public review make the summit-level commitment verifiable In the wartime situation Ukrainian implementation may slip, and a public review would also bring this to the surface as a source of tension
Territorial catching-up and agriculture The region-by-region justification steers funds towards shrinking and vulnerable areas According to Portfolio, the stricter EU set of conditions may also make access to farm support harder, which affects rural areas the most

The most important dilemma is the choice between publicity and negotiating flexibility. According to diplomatic practice, the details of ongoing negotiations need not be published, and programme point KP3 on transparent foreign policy also acknowledges this. MIAK therefore asks for public disclosure not of the negotiating tactics, but of the objective and the result: what the country asked for, and what it got. The second dilemma is timing. According to Rapporteur, the Brussels trade publication linked to Euractiv, the year-end deadline has been removed from the draft summit conclusions, and French right-wing politician Marine Le Pen called an agreement before the French election a “democratic scandal”. According to AP, a slip in December does not mean a shortage of money, but the implementing legislation must be adopted in 2027 for the funds to arrive from January 2028. The Hungarian interest is therefore not a fast agreement but one with good content, and a publicly recorded objective serves this better than a hasty bargain.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • Post-summit report. Target: by 23 October the report containing the four pieces of information is published. It is worth following whether the Hungarian national envelope decreases in the next negotiating documents compared with the Irish proposal, and whether the region-by-region justification of the requested surplus is public.
  • The migration fine. Target: monthly publication of the accumulating amount from November, and submission of the asylum bill during the parliamentary debate on the 2027 budget. It is worth following when the Government asks the Commission for a finding of compliance, and when the daily amount stops.
  • The Hungarian–Ukrainian commitments. Target: a written statement within 72 hours of Friday’s meeting, with point-by-point deadlines; the text of the ten-point agreement is public. It is worth following whether the interim review appears before the Berehove meeting.
  • The timetable of the agreement. It is worth following whether the regulation on the multiannual financial framework is adopted by the end of 2027, so that the 2028 funds can start without disruption.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the Government for three documents. A report on the Hungarian budget objectives one week after the summit, with a needs-based justification. The bill needed to comply with the asylum judgment, and a monthly statement of the fine. A written joint statement with deadlines on Friday’s meeting, and a public review before Berehove. The summit is a good occasion for confirmation, but the result is preserved by paper, not by a handshake.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and data-drivenness are at stake here. Transparency requires that voters see what the country asked for and what it got, not just the success story. Data-drivenness requires that the claim for additional funds rest on the measured situation of the regions, not on a political grievance. This way the Hungarian claim will also be stronger at the negotiating table.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal segment, HVG’s Eurologus column went through the full agenda and called the first official meeting between Péter Magyar and Zelenskyy the biggest possible breakthrough of the summit. It also described in detail the expected migration dispute between Sánchez and Meloni. HVG’s domestic column focused on Transcarpathian rights and highlighted the next stage of language-use, administrative and political rights. Telex highlighted two strands. On the budget, the prime minister’s message of “it does not decrease, it does not increase”; on migration, the loss of some one billion euros caused by the fine, attributed directly to the previous government. 444.hu described the summit as tenser and more difficult than the June one (the article was not publicly downloadable, only its lead). Another of its articles emphasised the conditional possibility of a Berehove meeting and the compensation claim.

In the public-affairs segment, Index placed the summit in a historical frame already in its headline: Péter Magyar wants to achieve what Viktor Orbán never managed. At the same time, it was this outlet that stated most clearly that the other member states are unlikely to accept the compensation argument. 24.hu described the programme and the circumstances of the trip, and the fact that in the prime minister’s absence Deputy Prime Minister Bálint Ruff coordinates the government’s work. ATV reported on the Ukrainian law as a breakthrough (the article was not publicly downloadable, only its lead). In the economic segment, according to Portfolio’s on-the-spot report, Hungary may be a relative winner. At the same time the outlet named two risks: an overly linked set of conditions and new revenues that place a disproportionate burden on poorer member states. It was this outlet that put the compensation question directly to the prime minister, and that also wrote about rural depopulation. From the conservative segment (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner), MIAK’s press monitor did not record an article on this topic.

In the international press, Politico put the Franco-German deadlock at the centre. In its view, Macron and Merz hold the key, but because of their domestic political situation they may be too weak to use it. Merz declared that he would rather have no agreement than one that increases the framework. In another article the outlet quoted Marine Le Pen’s pledge to cut the French contribution by 11.1 billion euros a year if she wins. Rapporteur, the Brussels trade publication linked to Euractiv, carried Meloni’s warning that the date cannot be more important than the content. According to its information, under pressure from Italy, France and Sweden the year-end deadline was removed from the draft conclusions. An analysis published in EUobserver drew attention to joint borrowing outside the budget. According to AP’s explainer, a slip in December does not mean an immediate shortage of money. The common blind spot of the segments is that none of the outlets spelled out the legal route to closing the fine, namely compliance with the judgment. The negotiations became news; the condition of compliance did not.

6.2 Facts and data

Budget and fine items (according to the sources indicated):

Item Amount / data Source
Headline amount of the Irish presidency proposal (10 October) 1.62 trillion euros Portfolio, AP
Headline amount of the same proposal according to other sources 1.83 trillion euros Index, Rapporteur
Cut compared with the Commission’s original proposal 141 billion euros (approx. 8%) Portfolio
The same according to the analysis published in EUobserver nearly 160 billion euros EUobserver
Change in the Hungarian envelope compared with the Cypriot draft approx. +1 billion euros Portfolio, Index, 444.hu
Cohesion funds lost for good (N+2 rule) approx. 2.1 billion euros Portfolio, Index
Surplus requested in the next framework up to 2 billion euros Portfolio
Migration fine: lump sum 200 million euros (CJEU, June 2024) Portfolio
Migration fine: penalty payment 1 million euros per day Portfolio, Telex
Fine burden so far, with late-payment interest approx. 1 billion euros Portfolio, Telex
Estimated share of joint borrowing outside the budget in the Irish proposal approx. 44%, some 800 billion euros EUobserver (author’s estimate)
The Friends of Cohesion group 17 member states HVG, Rapporteur
Expected length of the Zelenskyy meeting approx. 10–15 minutes Index, 444.hu

The sources gave two figures for the headline amount. Portfolio and AP wrote of 1.62 trillion euros, Index and Rapporteur of 1.83 trillion. The two values were probably calculated at different price levels (constant and current prices respectively), but the articles processed do not clarify this. There is also a discrepancy in the size of the cut: Portfolio wrote of 141 billion euros, the analysis published in EUobserver of nearly 160 billion. MIAK therefore asks in proposal 3.1 for the Hungarian envelope to be shown at both price levels.

Timeline:

Date Event Source
June 2024 The CJEU imposes a lump sum of 200 million euros and a daily penalty payment of 1 million euros Portfolio
10 October 2026 The Irish presidency sends out the negotiating document Portfolio, EUobserver
12 October 2026 The Ukrainian parliament adopts the law on education in minority languages Telex, HVG
14 October 2026 Péter Magyar’s press conference in Brussels; Le Pen’s press conference in Brussels; the prime minister holds talks with the leaders of the Visegrád Four Telex, Portfolio, Politico
15–16 October 2026 Meeting of the European Council; on Thursday a cohesion consultation at the initiative of the Italian prime minister HVG, Telex
16 October 2026 (morning) First official meeting between Péter Magyar and Zelenskyy Telex, Index
19–20 October 2026 The 2027 Hungarian budget proposal may go before the National Assembly Portfolio
29 November 2026 Early Spanish election HVG
December 2026 The originally targeted deadline for agreement, which was removed from the draft conclusions Rapporteur, Politico
April 2027 French presidential election Politico, Rapporteur
January 2028 Start of the new seven-year framework AP

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — separating the issues is a matter of principled pragmatism (KP4), finding allies for the additional request is a task of issue-based coalition building (KP17), and monitoring the Hungarian–Ukrainian roadmap is a task of preventive diplomacy (KP15); publicity of the objective and the result is part of transparent foreign policy (KP3);
  • Economy (programme points) — the post-summit report is a practice of radical transparency (G19); the budgetary impact of the fine burden and of a slipping agreement is part of the debt sustainability framework (G23);
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — the region-by-region justification of the additional request and the targeting of funds are a task of data-based allocation (TE2);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the repayment rule and project-level publicity of the additional funds are part of cohesion accountability (A8);
  • Education (background material) — the implementation of minority education in Transcarpathia, whose measurement at school level MIAK proposed on 13 October;
  • Agriculture (background material) — the protection of agricultural funds and the set of conditions for farm support in the new framework; the stricter, linked conditions may also affect farmers’ access.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Union: The EU founding treaties (TEU, TFEU)

The three questions of today’s summit are framed by three treaty rules. On the multiannual financial framework, Article 312(2) TFEU provides:

“The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework. The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members.”

It follows that the Hungarian envelope cannot be protected permanently by the veto of a single country, but no single country can be forced into a framework that is unacceptable to it. The compensation claim can therefore only succeed if the other 26 member states also accept it, and a measurable, needs-based justification has a chance of achieving this. The legal basis of the penalty payment is Article 260(2) TFEU:

“If the Court finds that the Member State concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment on it.”

And under paragraph (1), the member state must take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment. The fine is therefore not a stand-alone penalty that can be bargained over, but the consequence of non-compliance. Proposal 3.2 therefore asks for implementation of the judgment and an official finding of compliance. Finally, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) names among the common values of the Union respect for human rights, “including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. And under Article 49, only a European state that respects these values may apply for membership. The rights of the Hungarians in Transcarpathia therefore appear in Ukraine’s accession process not as a bilateral favour, but as an EU benchmark. Proposal 3.3 ties this benchmark to deadlines.

📖 Source: Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions, Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26 October 2012), Articles 2 and 49 TEU, Articles 260 and 312 TFEU

6.4.2 T. G. Otte: Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Kissinger chapter)

In the volume’s chapter on Kissinger, Otte describes how the assessment of summits was perhaps the only question on which Kissinger changed his mind. In his early writings he considered them futile if the parties did not share common principles. Later he accepted that a summit could help détente, but only as a tool. At a summit, concrete issues should be negotiated, not the general atmosphere. Decisions should be worked out in detail in advance, in lower-level negotiations. According to Kissinger’s own memoirs, heads of government are too busy to master the details needed for successful negotiation. If a deadlock arises at a summit, there is nowhere to turn, and a summit is too short to allow the analysis that ensures the durability of an agreement. Otte also highlights that, according to Kissinger, in a deadlock heads of government may be forced into dangerous concessions to save the summit and their own domestic political position. A summit should therefore aim at substance, not appearance. For today’s situation this means two things. Friday’s 15 minutes are suitable not for negotiation but for confirming an agreement prepared at a lower level, which is why proposal 3.3 asks for it to be recorded in writing. And at the budget summit, the danger of pressure to concede shows that it is not worth bringing the fine into the budget bargain, where in a deadlock it could easily be traded away.

📖 Source: T. G. Otte: Kissinger. In: G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, T. G. Otte (eds.): Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger (Palgrave, 2001)

6.4.3 Dan Petrica: International Organizations, Summits and Conferences

Petrica defines summits as meetings of heads of state and government, or of the top leaders of international organisations. Following the British diplomacy scholar Geoff R. Berridge, he distinguishes three types. Regularly recurring summits allow the parties to resolve deadlocks over several meetings, and between two sessions the questions can also be debated in domestic politics. Here the leaders can also strike package deals, because they can link instruments from several sectors. In Petrica’s example, the European Council is the model case of an institutionalised summit. The third type is the high-level exchange of views: mostly bilateral, lower-profile, and serving primarily to consolidate good relations. Referring to Hans Morgenthau, the American theorist of international relations, Petrica writes that the summit is a complement to the regular diplomatic process, preceded and followed by preparatory negotiations. If a communiqué is issued after the summit, it must be prepared well in advance. For today’s two events this offers two kinds of lessons. The European Council is a regularly recurring summit, so a missed agreement in October or December is not a failure but part of the process. The Hungarian interest is the content, not the date, just as proposal 3.1 fixes the objectives, not the deadline. Friday’s meeting, by contrast, is a high-level exchange of views, whose value lies in confirming an already prepared commitment at the highest level. That is why, under proposal 3.3, it must be recorded in writing, with deadlines.

📖 Source: Dan Petrica: International Organizations, Summits and Conferences. In: Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy — An Introduction (2nd edition, Cluj University Press)

6.5 International comparison

A slipping deadline is not a new phenomenon. Index recalls that agreement on the current 2021–2027 framework was reached in 2020 after a five-day marathon summit. According to Rapporteur, this time Italy, France and Sweden asked for the deadline to be dropped, that is, the cohesion group, the net contributors and the French interest group alike. The loosening of the deadline is thus not the obstruction of a single country, but the shadow of the 2027 French, Italian and Polish elections. According to Politico, if she wins, Le Pen would cut the French contribution by 11.1 billion euros a year, and according to Rapporteur she would consider an agreement before the election a “democratic scandal”. Hungarian calculations must therefore also reckon with a scenario that slips into 2027, in which some of the negotiating partners may change.

In the migration dispute, according to HVG, the Spanish government points to a 74 per cent drop in arrivals on the Atlantic route, which it attributes to cooperation with Mauritania and Senegal. Italy, by contrast, criticises the Spanish legalisation policy. According to the draft Council conclusions described by Portfolio, the number of irregular border crossings has fallen to its lowest level since 2021. According to Portfolio, the Hungarian government is no longer going its own way in this debate, because the EU mainstream has become stricter. This makes it easier for Hungary to steer the fine onto a legal route, because in the EU debate strict border protection and an asylum procedure that complies with the judgment are no longer in opposition.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP4 — Doctrine of principled pragmatism
  • KP15 — Institutionalising preventive diplomacy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU

Economy

  • G19 — Radical transparency in economic decision-making
  • G23 — Public debt sustainability framework

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE2 — Data-based allocation of EU cohesion funds

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — making full use of the Hungarian allocation

Proposed new programme point: Public post-summit report: a report published within one week after every European Council meeting on Hungary’s negotiating objectives, the results achieved and the open questions — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 15 October 2026 — topic 1; MIAK foreign press monitor, 15 October 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (consolidated versions)
  • 📖 T. G. Otte: Kissinger. In: G. R. Berridge, Maurice Keens-Soper, T. G. Otte (eds.): Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger
  • 📖 Dan Petrica: International Organizations, Summits and Conferences. In: Valentin Naumescu – Diana-Nicoleta Petruț (eds.): Foreign Policy and Diplomacy — An Introduction

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP4, KP15, KP17)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point ID: G19, G23)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point ID: TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Education (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 15 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 97/100
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 15 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 96/100

Supplementary public data sources (if used):

  • Suggested data sources for follow-up: the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 15–16 October 2026, the Irish presidency’s negotiating document, the European Commission’s Cohesion Open Data Platform, Eurostat’s regional population projections, the annual regional report of the European Committee of the Regions, the 2027 Hungarian budget bill

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