Part I — Situation overview

On Friday evening, 16 October 2026 (in the early hours of Saturday, Hungarian time), US President Donald Trump suspended by executive order the key provisions of the new sanctions law against Russia, two days before it was due to take effect. The law was initiated by the late Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, passed by Congress and signed by Trump in September. It would have allowed tariffs of up to 100 per cent on exports to the United States from the five largest buyers of Russian oil and gas. It would also have sanctioned Russian financial institutions, Vladimir Putin himself, and the so-called shadow fleet, that is, the tankers of obscure ownership used to circumvent embargoes (24.hu and 444.hu based on MTI, Portfolio, BBC). According to the order, the suspension lasts until the President or his senior officials decide otherwise; Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke of a 60-day pause. In the same week it emerged that Starshield, the military version of SpaceX’s Starlink network used by the Ukrainian army, does not work above a speed of roughly 160 kilometres per hour. According to HVG and Politico, this made it impossible to intercept fast Russian jet-powered drones. According to Reuters the restriction was ordered by the White House, according to the Telegraph it was initiated by Elon Musk; Trump denies it (Telex, HVG). On Thursday, 13 nautical miles from the Sulina mouth of the Danube, drones hit the chemical tanker Wine Trader; seven of its 12 crew are missing (BBC). On Friday Bulgaria asked NATO for fighter aircraft and counter-drone systems (Portfolio).

On 9 August MIAK wrote about the exemption conditions of the law now suspended, and on 13 October about the US–Russian diesel deal and a supply plan that does not count on US relief. On the Black Sea thread, analyses appeared on 7 October and 15 October. The new element is Hungary’s direct stake. Prime Minister Péter Magyar told 444.hu that Hungary has an exemption from the US sanctions on Russian oil until November, and that after the diesel deal it “would not be logical” not to grant it for at least another year. Meanwhile the Defence Minister announced that the Hungarian Defence Forces could receive a domestically developed, deployable laser counter-drone weapon within a year (Portfolio, HVG).

MIAK’s reading: the week’s three developments show the same thing. Relief, a service or protection provided by an ally can be withdrawn by a single political decision. Hungary’s room for manoeuvre therefore does not depend on whether the country receives the next US concession. It depends on whether the country’s oil supply, critical communications and air defence can withstand such a concession not coming.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three authors provide the interpretive framework. Zbigniew Brzezinski (Polish-born American political scientist, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter) writes in The Grand Chessboard (1997) that if a region’s main pipelines run through the territory of a single power, this creates political dependence even without open pressure. The monopoly is broken only by new routes. This is the yardstick for the question of Hungary’s oil exemption: the exemption manages the dependence, it does not end it. Henry Kissinger (American diplomat, National Security Advisor and later Secretary of State to Presidents Nixon and Ford) describes alliance credibility in Ending the Vietnam War as an indivisible strategic asset. If a great power backs away from its commitments for domestic political reasons, this erodes the credibility of all its other agreements as well. Niccolò Machiavelli (Florentine statesman and political thinker) considers auxiliary troops, that is, armed forces lent by another power, dangerous in The Prince (1532). They serve the aims of the lender, not of the recipient. Machiavelli does not argue against alliances, but for the view that defence without one’s own capability is at the mercy of others’ decisions. The detailed discussion of the literature — author by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first concerns the US oil exemption expiring in November, the second critical communication dependencies, and the third counter-drone procurement and the Hungarian contribution to the eastern flank. MIAK does not repeat here the 13 October analysis’s supply plan that does not count on US relief, or the 15 October analysis’s proposal of conditional Hungarian support for a joint NATO Black Sea command, but builds on them.

3.1 An exemption request with a public oil replacement timetable, not citing the diesel deal (before the request is submitted, by 15 November 2026 at the latest)

According to Portfolio, the US exemption was announced in November 2025 by Péter Szijjártó, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the US side renews it annually. MIAK supports the Government requesting the extension, because the loss of Russian crude oil arriving via the Druzhba pipeline cannot be replaced in the short term without a cost shock. The argument, however, should not be based on the diesel deal. The US–Russian deal has been criticised by Ukraine, the EU institutions and several member states. If Budapest cites it, the Hungarian request appears as the continuation of a step that most allies consider a mistake. The request should be based on what the exception clause of the now-suspended law originally required: a verifiable, dated replacement path. On 9 August MIAK proposed that this timetable be ready by 31 October (see the analysis of 9 August). The present request is the natural occasion for it. On a submission by the minister responsible for energy policy, the Government should publish the timetable before submitting the request. It should include the tested capacity of the Adriatic route, the schedule for converting the refineries, the quarterly share of Russian crude oil until the end of 2027, and which office certifies the data. According to Brzezinski’s thesis (see 6.4.1), dependence turns not on the supplier’s intentions but on the route being the only one. The exemption therefore does not become a lasting dependence only if a second route is actually being built alongside it. This is an application of K7 energy-market shock resilience, G25 energy-price shock preparedness plan and KP22 exit-strategy planning protocol.

3.2 An inventory of critical communication dependencies and Hungarian support for Ukraine’s association with the EU satellite programme (inventory by 31 December 2026, Council position by the next round of negotiations)

The lesson of the Starshield affair is not limited to Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told Politico that in EU countries the same terminals also worked above 180 kilometres per hour, meaning that the restriction was targeted. If the military communications of a country at war depend on the decision of a single foreign private company and a foreign government, that is a sovereignty risk. MIAK proposes that the Government, on a joint submission by the Defence Minister and the minister responsible for digitalisation, have an inventory compiled by 31 December. It should show which communication and positioning services of the Hungarian Defence Forces and of critical infrastructure depend on a single provider based outside Europe, and what the fallback solution is. The details may remain classified, but a public summary should be prepared on the number of systems affected and the schedule for replacing them. The National Assembly’s committees dealing with national security and defence should receive full information in closed session. Machiavelli’s thesis on auxiliary troops (see 6.4.3) warns of exactly this situation: borrowed capability serves the aims of the lender. The second element is European. According to Politico, the European Commission has been negotiating with Ukraine since March on association with the Govsatcom programme, the EU’s governmental secure satellite communication system, without a breakthrough. Norway and Iceland have already reached agreement. The EU’s own satellite network, IRIS², will only be completed by 2030. MIAK proposes that Hungary publicly support Ukraine’s rapid association in the Council discussions. This is an issue-based step that also serves Hungarian security: every drone intercepted by Ukrainian air defence also reduces the burden on the eastern flank. This is an application of D17 space and sovereign digital infrastructure, HV9 independent defence capability and KP17 issue-based coalition building in the EU.

3.3 A public counter-drone procurement decision and a concrete Hungarian offer in response to the Romanian and Bulgarian requests (decision document by 31 March 2027, offer for the next substantive meeting of the North Atlantic Council)

According to Portfolio, the Defence Minister said that after the demonstration in Várpalota, the leadership of the Defence Forces and the General Staff must set the order of priorities for procurement and development. They have to decide which existing systems to buy and which prototypes to invest in developing further. MIAK welcomes the fact that the order is set by a professional body. It proposes that the Ministry of Defence publish an unclassified decision document by 31 March 2027. It should include the selection criteria, the expected unit cost of the laser weapon compared with existing air-defence assets, the share of domestic suppliers, and which elements can be financed through EU joint procurement or joint development. According to Index, Russia has built a base in six weeks from which more than a hundred jet-powered drones can be launched in a single day. Counter-drone defence on the eastern flank is therefore urgent, but urgency does not justify bypassing public scrutiny. Machiavelli’s thesis (see 6.4.3) argues for one’s own capability, and Kissinger’s credibility argument (see 6.4.2) for this capability also being committed to the allies. Telex, citing Deutsche Welle, wrote that on Saturday Romanian F-16s shot down two drones 20 kilometres from Sulina, and that the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s decision-making body, will discuss the incident on Tuesday. The 15 October analysis proposed that the Government offer a contribution by 14 November. Bulgaria’s request now names the need concretely: counter-drone defence. MIAK proposes that the Government make a concrete offer in this area at the next substantive Council meeting, for example training, intelligence data or opening the domestic test range to joint development. The laser prototype could only be deployable in a year’s time, so it cannot be part of the offer. This is an application of HV2 transparency of defence spending, HV4 EU joint procurement, HV12 geostrategic defence planning and KP24 maintenance of alliance relations.

The three proposals are linked by a single principle: where Hungary relies on someone else’s decision, it should make visible how it is reducing that dependence, and where it builds its own capability, it should also commit it to its allies. For oil this means the replacement timetable, for communications the dependency inventory and support for the EU alternative, and for counter-drone defence the public procurement decision and the concrete offer. Brzezinski’s dependency thesis (see 6.4.1) and Kissinger’s credibility argument (see 6.4.2) lead to the same place: a concession buys time, but only what the country builds during that time gives it room for manoeuvre.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Energy security and the economy In the short term the exemption protects fuel prices; the public timetable makes replacement predictable If the US side rejects the request, accelerating the replacement path brings a one-off cost shock
Foreign policy The request appears not as a continuation of the diesel deal but as a security-of-supply argument; support for Govsatcom aligns the Hungarian position with the EU majority Washington may interpret distancing from the diesel deal as criticism of US policy
Defence The dependency inventory and the procurement decision make capability gaps and costs visible The public summary could point to sensitive vulnerabilities if it is not aggregated enough
Alliance relations A concrete counter-drone offer strengthens Hungarian credibility on the eastern flank Too small an offer may look symbolic, too large an offer may divert resources from domestic air defence
Society Slowing the attacks on Ukraine’s energy system reduces the likelihood of a new refugee wave Zelenskyy’s twenty-million refugee scenario (Politico) may stir exaggerated fears in the domestic debate

The most important question to weigh is whether the exemption request weakens Hungary’s alliance credibility. According to MIAK it does not, if the request comes with conditions. A country that, because of its geography, depends on a single pipeline is entitled to ask for a transition period. The transition is credible if its end point is visible. The risk side grows if, after the exemption is extended, replacement slows down because the pressure has gone. That is why the timetable must be published before the request, not after it.

The second dilemma is the relationship between openness and security. The details of counter-drone defence and critical communications may indeed remain classified. The criteria, the order of magnitude of unit costs and the replacement schedule, however, are not secrets; HV2 lays down precisely the principle of “public by default, classified where justified”. The proposal tips towards the risk side if the public summary is so detailed that it gives an attacker a map. That is why it relies on aggregated data and closed committee oversight.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • A public oil replacement timetable before the exemption request. Target: by 15 November 2026. It is worth following the quarterly share of Russian crude oil until the end of 2027, measured against the path set out in the timetable.
  • A public summary of the inventory of critical communication dependencies. Target: by 31 December 2026. It is worth following how many of the affected systems receive a fallback solution by the end of 2027.
  • An unclassified counter-drone decision document. Target: by 31 March 2027, with the selection criteria, the unit cost and the share of domestic suppliers.
  • A concrete Hungarian offer for counter-drone defence on the eastern flank. Target: the next substantive meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It is worth following whether the content of the offer is public and whether it is delivered by the first half of 2027.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. It should ask for the US oil exemption to be extended, but not by citing the diesel deal; instead, with a replacement timetable that is published in advance and can be verified. It should assess which military and critical communication systems depend on a single foreign provider, and support Ukraine’s rapid association with the EU satellite programme. A public decision document should be prepared on counter-drone procurement, and a concrete Hungarian offer made in response to the Romanian and Bulgarian requests.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and data-drivenness are at stake here. Transparency, because an exemption request or an arms purchase is credible before allies and the public only if its justification and conditions are known in advance. Data-drivenness, because the reduction of dependence is shown not by announcements but by quarterly shares, inventories and unit costs.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal segment, HVG put the Starshield affair in the foreground. Based on the Telegraph, it wrote that Musk initiated the restriction, Trump approved it and the Pentagon carried it out. In one analysis it warned about the development of the Russian Rassvet satellite system. It reported on the laser weapon with a quote highlighting the Defence Minister’s pride. 444.hu, based on MTI, framed the suspension with Reuters’ remark that the sanctions would have raised US fuel prices before the midterm congressional elections. In a separate interview it asked the Prime Minister about the diesel deal, so this outlet was the first to bring up the thread of the Hungarian exemption. Telex carried Zelenskyy’s phrase “sanctions blackout”, the weekend Russian strikes, and the Romanian F-16s’ counter-drone action. Népszava’s articles could not be processed on this day.

In the mainstream public-affairs segment, 24.hu presented the suspension as a “serious gesture” towards Putin and, based on the BBC, highlighted the bipartisan US protest. Index focused not on the diplomatic but on the military side: the Russian drone base built in six weeks in the Rostov region and the unpreparedness of the eastern flank. ATV published an expert discussion on NATO’s new war plan (the content of the video was available only as a description).

In the economic press, Portfolio ran four threads in parallel. It described in detail the law’s tariff rules and the protests of China and India. From the Prime Minister’s interview it highlighted the history of the exemption, from the Romanian President’s interview with Euronews the request for NATO assistance, and from the defence demonstration the question of procurement priorities. Portfolio was the only one to flag the open question of the procurement decision in its report on the laser weapon.

In the conservative segment, according to MIAK’s press monitor, Magyar Nemzet did not list the topic among its featured topics on this day, and Mandiner did not publish an article that MIAK could process.

In the international press, the BBC and Al Jazeera put the criticism of Republican senators at the centre: according to Thom Tillis, they are demanding the implementation of a law passed by 86 votes to 11. Politico analysed Ukraine’s communication dependence and the delay of the EU alternative in two articles, and Zelenskyy’s warning on refugees in a third. According to EUobserver, Zelenskyy believes that after diesel and coal “gas could be next”, that is, US sanctions may gradually loosen. On the Black Sea thread, the BBC and DW covered the rescue operation and the Romanian–Bulgarian consultation with NATO, while Balkan Insight described the shortcomings of Bulgaria’s security strategy. Unlike the domestic press, the international outlets asked less about the Hungarian exemption and more about the rift in US domestic politics and European vulnerability. The articles of AP and of Rapporteur, Euractiv’s Brussels newsletter, could not be downloaded publicly.

6.2 Facts and data

The timeline (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
November 2025 Péter Szijjártó, then minister, announces Hungary’s exemption from the US sanctions on Russian oil Portfolio
September 2026 Trump signs the sanctions law passed by Congress 24.hu (MTI), BBC
9 October 2026 Trump announces the US–Russian diesel agreement Portfolio
15 October 2026 (Thursday) Drones hit the tanker Wine Trader at the Sulina mouth of the Danube; the Yara J was hit one day earlier BBC, DW
16 October 2026 (Friday) Bulgaria asks NATO for fighter aircraft and counter-drone systems; Trump suspends the key provisions of the sanctions law Portfolio, BBC
16–17 October 2026 Russian strikes on the Ukrainian energy system; demonstration of the laser counter-drone prototype Politico, DW, Portfolio
17 October 2026 (Saturday) Romanian F-16s shoot down two drones 20 kilometres from Sulina Telex (based on DW)
18 October 2026 The original entry-into-force date of the sanctions law 24.hu (MTI)
3 November 2026 Midterm elections in the United States; Congress is in recess until then Al Jazeera
November 2026 Hungary’s exemption expires 444.hu, Portfolio

Discrepancies between the sources:

Question Claim 1 Claim 2
Duration of the suspension indefinite, until the President or his officials decide otherwise (24.hu based on MTI, Portfolio, Al Jazeera) a 60-day pause to analyse the impact on the world economy (Rubio, BBC)
Who ordered the Starshield restriction the White House instructed the Department of Defense (Reuters, based on Telex and Politico); Musk initiated it, Trump approved it (Telegraph, HVG) according to a US official it did not come from the President; Trump denies it (Politico, Telex)
Volume of the diesel deal more than 300 thousand tonnes immediately (Portfolio) 2–2.5 million tonnes by the end of the year (HVG, analysts)
Position of the Wine Trader 13 nautical miles from the mouth of the Danube (BBC) at anchor at the mouth of the Sulina Channel, in Romanian territorial waters (DW)

Data on the Russian strikes and the drone threat:

Data point Value Source
Drones and missiles used in the weekend strike more than 320 Politico
Consumers left without power approx. 1 million (since restored) Politico, Telex
Energy facilities attacked more than 15 DW, BBC
Starshield speed limit approx. 160 km/h HVG, Politico
Speed of Russian jet-powered drones up to 500–600 km per hour HVG, Index
Launch capacity at the new Rostov base more than 100 drones in 24 hours Index
Cargo ships attacked off the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts in 10 days at least five further ships, at least 23 sailors killed DW
Ukrainians under temporary protection in the EU more than 4 million Politico (based on Eurostat)

Decision rules: Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows any ally to request consultations if it considers its territorial integrity or security threatened (BBC). The North Atlantic Council decides by consensus, so the Hungarian position counts in every allied response. The US exemption is a US executive decision; the Hungarian side has no legal claim to it; the Government can only request it.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the relationship between the exemption request and alliance credibility (programme point ID: KP23); room for manoeuvre between Washington and Brussels (programme point ID: KP11); the replacement timetable as an exit scenario (programme point ID: KP22); issue-based support for Ukraine’s Govsatcom association (programme point ID: KP17); the offer to the eastern flank (programme point ID: KP24);
  • Defence (programme points) — domestic counter-drone defence as an own capability (programme point ID: HV9); transparency of the procurement decision (programme point ID: HV2); EU joint procurement and development (programme point ID: HV4); the Black Sea threat in geostrategic planning (programme point ID: HV12);
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — diversification of oil supply (programme point ID: K7);
  • Economy (programme points) — managing the fuel-price risk should the exemption not be granted (programme point ID: G25);
  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — sovereign and EU fallback for critical communications (programme point ID: D17).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard

In his 1997 book Brzezinski writes about the “geopolitical pivots” of Eurasia. These are states whose importance derives not from their power but from their position. He places Ukraine in this group. He notes that Ukraine’s independence deprived Russia of its dominant position on the Black Sea, because Odesa had been Russia’s gateway to the Mediterranean and to world trade. In the part on the energy routes of the Caspian region he formulates a more general thesis. If a region’s main pipelines run through the territory of a single power, the political consequences assert themselves even without open pressure, and the region remains politically dependent. If, however, further pipelines are built in other directions, no single power holds a monopoly over access. (Because the work’s rights status is still to be cleared, only a paraphrase is given here.)

Applied to Hungary’s oil supply, the dependence stems from the Druzhba pipeline being the only route, not from whether the supplier happens to be exerting pressure. The US exemption does not change this; it only reduces the cost of the dependence for a year. Proposal 3.1 therefore ties the exemption request to a timetable that measures the actual capacity of the second route and the decline of the Russian share. On the Black Sea thread, Brzezinski’s Odesa thesis explains why shipping along the Romanian and Bulgarian coasts, and with it the mouth of the Danube, has become a target. This is where it is decided whether Ukraine keeps its outlet to the sea.

📖 Source: Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard — American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997)

6.4.2 Henry Kissinger: Ending the Vietnam War

In his 2003 summary work Kissinger treats the dilemma of the withdrawal from Vietnam as a question of alliance credibility. He writes that no serious policymaker can afford to disparage, as is fashionable, the notions of prestige and credibility. A great power that abandons a small ally to ease its domestic difficulties also undermines the building of a more durable international order. In a later part of the work he analyses the situation in which the legislature restricted the executive’s ability to honour its commitments. In his view, this called into question not only the agreement concerned but the credibility of all the country’s other existing and future agreements. Credibility is therefore indivisible: lost in a single case, it becomes more expensive in every other. (Because the work’s rights status is still to be cleared, only a paraphrase is given here.)

In the present situation the roles are reversed. Here it is the executive that has suspended sanctions adopted by the legislature, according to the criticism of Republican senators partly because of fuel prices ahead of the midterm elections. According to Kissinger’s thesis, the price of this is not paid only by Ukraine: every ally reprices how much US commitments are worth. For Hungary the lesson runs in two directions. On the one hand, no lasting supply plan can be built on a US exemption (3.1). On the other hand, Hungarian credibility is also indivisible. If Budapest contributes to the defence of the eastern flank only with words while asking for a US concession, it displays the same duality that is criticised in Washington. That is why MIAK proposes the concrete counter-drone offer (3.3).

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Ending the Vietnam War — A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (2003)

6.4.3 Niccolò Machiavelli: A fejedelem (The Prince)

In the chapters on the defence of principalities, Machiavelli distinguishes three kinds of armed force: one’s own, mercenaries and auxiliaries. By auxiliaries he means the forces that a more powerful ally sends in aid. In his view these troops are good for the purposes of those who send them, but harmful to whoever called them in, because they follow someone else’s orders. He closes Chapter XIII with two terse sentences:

“In the end, the arms of others either fall from your back, or weigh you down, or bind you. […] without its own arms no principality is secure; it can only trust to good fortune to escape harm.”

The Starshield restriction is a present-day example of this thesis. One day a borrowed capability “fell from” its user because of a political decision by the lender, at the very moment of an attack. The lesson is not the rejection of alliances. NATO membership remains Hungary’s security guarantee, and HV9 also prescribes the parallel development of the alliance and national capability. The lesson is that for critical capabilities one must know where one’s own ends and the borrowed begins. This is what the 3.2 dependency inventory measures. And the domestic laser counter-drone weapon serves one’s own capability if the procurement decision is public and well-founded (3.3).

📖 Source: Niccolò Machiavelli: A fejedelem (The Prince) (1532), Chapters XII–XIII

6.5 International comparison

The closest parallel is Romania. Romanian President Nicușor Dan said in an interview reported by Portfolio that the airspace violations began a year and a half ago and Bucharest was not prepared. It is now asking for a stronger NATO presence, and has received a promise of “necessary equipment” from France. At the same time Dan trusts in Trump’s support, even though Washington has repeatedly called its European commitments into question. The Romanian example shows that the coastal allies rely on US and European partners simultaneously while also developing their own air defence. According to Balkan Insight, what caused controversy in Bulgaria was precisely that the government avoided naming Russia directly, and according to a former deputy defence minister this inaction is dangerous.

In managing communication dependence, Norway and Iceland are the example: according to Politico, both have reached agreement with the EU on Govsatcom association, whereas Ukraine has been negotiating since March. Several Members of the European Parliament, including the French MEP Christophe Grudler and the Finnish MEP Aura Salla, have urged a rapid reduction of technological dependence. In counter-drone defence the EU is already paying: according to EUobserver, this week the Commission disbursed 2.9 billion euros to Ukraine for the procurement of drones, air-defence systems and electronic warfare equipment. There is no unity within the United States either. The Senate passed the sanctions law by 86 votes to 11, and the suspension was criticised by Republican senators Ted Cruz, John Cornyn and Thom Tillis (BBC, Al Jazeera). A Hungarian exemption request is therefore addressed to a Washington in which the legislature and the executive see the question of Russian oil differently.

Foreign policy

  • KP11 — Strategic balance policy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition building in the EU
  • KP22 — Exit-strategy planning protocol
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)
  • KP24 — Cyclical maintenance of alliance relations

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement
  • HV9 — Independent defence capability (the “own arms” doctrine)
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience

Economy

  • G25 — Energy-price shock preparedness plan

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D17 — Space and sovereign digital infrastructure

Suggested new programme point: Dependency inventory of critical capabilities: a survey updated every two years, accompanied by an unclassified summary, of which military and critical infrastructure services depend on a single provider based outside Europe or on a single government decision, with the schedule for fallback solutions — for the Defence and Digitalisation and AI regulation areas.

6.7 List of sources

Domestic press sources (MIAK press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topic 2):

International press sources (MIAK international press monitor, 18 October 2026 — topics 2 and 4):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard — American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997)
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Ending the Vietnam War — A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (2003)
  • 📖 Niccolò Machiavelli: A fejedelem (The Prince) (1532)

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources (suggested for proposals 3.1–3.3):

  • the White House executive order of 16 October and the licences of the US Treasury’s sanctions office (OFAC)
  • NATO’s releases on strengthening the eastern flank and on the meetings of the North Atlantic Council
  • the European Commission’s Govsatcom and IRIS² documentation
  • the crude oil import data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) and Eurostat’s energy statistics

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