Part I — Situation overview

According to an Interior Minister’s decree published in the 20 October issue of the Magyar Közlöny (the official gazette), the National Office for Asset Recovery and Asset Protection (NVVH) may, like the prosecution service, order searches for wanted persons and issue arrest warrants (444.hu, MTI). The office has been added to the bodies entitled to use the wanted-persons register. If the NVVH or the prosecution service orders the search or the arrest warrant, bringing in and escorting the person concerned is the task of the police and the border-policing bodies. Under the decree, the office also becomes part of the DNA-sampling and biometric data-processing procedures, so it may process and supply biometric data in these procedures. Biometric data means facial images, fingerprints and any other physical characteristic that uniquely identifies a person. The president, the deputy presidents and the statistical staff have access to the criminal statistics system. The data of the office’s own criminal cases, however, can only be accessed by those handling the case, their superiors and the statisticians (Portfolio).

The NVVH’s criminal-procedure powers entered into force on 27 September. The office’s first substantive step was taking MP Miklós Seszták into custody on 28 September in the Volánbusz case (Portfolio). MIAK’s earlier NVVH analyses dealt with the standard for presenting the first four cases and the election of the deputy presidents; this piece does not repeat them. Meanwhile, accountability is advancing on several threads. On Tuesday, the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) searched the premises of the National Film Institute in proceedings launched on suspicion of budget fraud (Telex). In the Gondosóra programme, both a criminal complaint and a data-protection report have been filed (Telex). On Wednesday afternoon, the parliamentary committee of inquiry into abuses in law enforcement is holding an extraordinary hearing of Pál Fürcht, former head of the Central Chief Prosecutor’s Investigation Office (KNYF). When he resigned, Fürcht wrote that he had come under political pressure via the Office of the Prosecutor General in sensitive cases. According to the Office of the Prosecutor General, his claims are untrue, and he has been suspended from his post as a prosecutor (444.hu, Magyar Nemzet).

MIAK’s reading: the decree does not in itself create new power. If the NVVH stands in place of the prosecution service in its own cases, the arrest warrant is a customary tool of the prosecuting authority. The question is whether control arrives along with it. Restrictions of liberty are checked by a judge, biometric data processing by an independent data protection authority, and the office’s operation by the public. All three work if the legal basis, the data flow and the frequency of use are visible.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework for the question. In her book Corruption and Government, Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor of law and political science at Yale University, one of the leading researchers of the political economy of corruption) compares the anti-corruption agencies of Hong Kong and Singapore. The Hong Kong agency was more constrained by review committees and independent courts, the Singapore one less so, and there suspects also accused the agency of harsh, unlawful conduct. In her view, a strong, independent agency is an effective tool only as long as politics cannot use it for its own ends. Montesquieu (an 18th-century French legal philosopher, the classic formulator of the theory of the separation of powers) writes in The Spirit of the Laws that a person invested with power is apt to abuse it, so power must be checked by power. Over an office issuing arrest warrants, this check is the judge. The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) classifies biometric data as a special category of personal data. It also expressly refers data processing for criminal-law purposes to the scope of a separate directive. At the NVVH, which investigates criminal cases and also conducts investigations outside criminal proceedings, this boundary runs within the institution. The detailed treatment of the literature — author by author, with a paraphrase of the argument and quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first two concern the legal basis and data processing of the NVVH’s new tools, the third the framework of this afternoon’s parliamentary hearing.

In the hierarchy of legal sources, a ministerial decree ranks below an Act, and may lay down rules only on the basis of, and within the limits of, a statutory authorisation. Under the NVVH bill put out to public consultation in June, the office exercises the rights and fulfils the obligations of the prosecution service in the criminal cases it takes into its own competence. If the adopted Act kept this, then the power to issue arrest warrants and order searches derives from the Act, and the decree regulates technical access to the registers. Today, however, the reader cannot see this. MIAK therefore proposes that the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice publish a map of the legal bases within 30 days. For every new NVVH power, it would give the authorising statutory provision and the implementing section of the decree. The second element is the data flow. Under the bill, the NVVH may conduct public-asset protection investigations even without suspicion of a criminal offence. Under the GDPR, data processing for criminal-law purposes falls under a different EU rule from other data processing by public authorities (see 6.4.3). DNA profiles, fingerprints and facial images obtained in a criminal case should therefore not be able to pass into the office’s administrative investigations. Every query should be logged. Within 60 days, the NVVH should adopt public data-processing rules and request the opinion of the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (NAIH) on them. The proposal builds on programme points D1 (responsible data-processing framework) and A6 (checks and balances).

3.2 A quarterly coercive-measures balance sheet from the NVVH (first publication by 31 January 2027, quarterly thereafter)

Under Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure (Be.), there is no legal remedy against the issuing of an arrest warrant. The arrested person must, however, be brought before the issuing prosecution office or investigating authority within 24 hours, and before the court within 72 hours. The judge decides on pre-trial detention. Control is therefore ex post and works in individual cases. The overall picture — how often and with what results a new office reaches for its strongest tool — can only be seen from statistics. MIAK proposes that the NVVH publish every quarter, without personally identifying data, the following five figures: the number of searches ordered and of arrest warrants issued, the proportion brought before a court within 72 hours, the number of motions for pre-trial detention and the proportion accepted by the court, and the number of data transfers requested from the biometric registers. In line with Montesquieu’s principle (see 6.4.2), the judicial acceptance rate is a joint measure of the office’s performance and its restraint. A persistently low rate points to excessive use of the tool, a rate close to 100 per cent to cautious motions. The balance sheet should also be part of the office’s annual report to the National Assembly. The proposal transfers to the NVVH the accountability element of programme point A10 (independent anti-corruption investigation office) and programme point KB7 (internal oversight).

3.3 A hearing framework and evidentiary labelling at the committee of inquiry (from today’s hearing until the final report)

The committee of inquiry is a body of the National Assembly. It may establish facts and draw conclusions, but it cannot establish criminal liability — that is the job of the court. The hearing of Pál Fürcht touches this boundary at two sensitive points. His claims may relate to pending criminal cases, and he himself is subject to disciplinary proceedings. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor General calls his claims untrue. MIAK proposes three steps. First: at the start of the hearing, the committee chair should state which questions will be discussed in closed session, because they concern investigative data of pending proceedings. Second: in the final report, the committee should classify every claim into three categories: supported by documents, based solely on testimony, or refuted by the body concerned. Third: the leadership of the prosecution service should clarify in writing how testimony before a parliamentary committee relates to the pending disciplinary proceedings. That way the witness knows what they may say, and the public knows what it can rely on. Rose-Ackerman’s lesson (see 6.4.1) applies here too. The credibility of accountability depends on whether the claims can be verified, not on how spectacular they are. The proposal follows the logic of programme points I10 (constitutional stress test) and A5 (whistleblower system).

The three proposals are linked by one common principle: the NVVH’s new tools need the same visible control as stands beside the similar tools of the prosecution service and the police. The legal basis should be demonstrable, sensitive data should not travel beyond its purpose, and the frequency of coercion should be measurable. Rose-Ackerman arrives at the same point from the side of external review, Montesquieu from the separation of powers, and the GDPR from purpose limitation.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law Publishing the map of legal bases and the judicial acceptance rate reduces the chance of later annulment and strengthens how well the office’s cases hold up in court. Statistics may create pressure for the office to request detention only in “safe” cases, and not use the tool even where justified.
Data protection Separating the criminal and administrative data flows prevents biometric data from being usable more widely than the purpose for which it was collected. The separation may slow down cases where a public-asset protection investigation turns into a criminal case; logging is an administrative burden.
Public administration Cooperation between the police, the NAV, the prosecution service and the NVVH runs through regulated channels; escort and registration tasks are clear. If the map of legal bases reveals a gap, a legislative amendment is needed, which may temporarily cause uncertainty for searches already ordered.
Parliamentary control Evidentiary labelling makes the final report more credible and reduces the endless dispute between claim and rebuttal. With too many closed sessions, the hearing loses its public value; the political sides may dispute the labelling too.

The main trade-off lies in proposal 3.2. The judicial acceptance rate is a useful measure, but it can become a bad target. If the office is judged by the rate, the measurement itself may distort: the office may avoid difficult but justified motions. MIAK therefore proposes not a target value but a time series, compared with the same data of the other investigating bodies. Proposal 3.1 becomes risky if a genuine case of public-asset loss stalls because of the data separation. This is handled not by lifting the separation, but by a fast rule, under judicial control, for converting an investigation into a criminal case.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes following these key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Map of legal bases: whether the statutory and decree-level basis of every new criminal-procedure and data-processing power of the NVVH is published by 20 November 2026.

  • Data-processing rules: whether by 20 December 2026 the NVVH adopts public rules on processing biometric and DNA data, and whether the NAIH’s opinion on them is published.

  • Judicial acceptance rate: in the first quarterly balance sheet (by 31 January 2027), what percentage of motions for pre-trial detention the court accepted, compared with the same indicator of the other investigating bodies.

  • Evidentiary labelling: in the final report of the committee of inquiry into abuses in law enforcement, what percentage of claims receive a documentary, testimony-based or refuted label.

5.2 Summary

MIAK supports the NVVH being able to investigate with the same tools as the prosecution service, because recovering public assets does not work without arrest warrants and access to registers. It asks the Government to show the statutory basis of the new powers within a month. It asks the NVVH to wall off biometric data obtained in criminal cases from its other investigations, and to account for coercive measures every quarter. And it asks the committee of inquiry to ensure that today’s hearing leaves behind verifiable claims with evidentiary labels. Two of MIAK’s foundational values are at stake here at once. Accountability requires that not only past abuses be called to account, but also the institution doing the calling to account. Transparency requires that the use of the state’s strongest tools be visible in numbers too. Accountability is credible if it proceeds according to rules that would be acceptable in the future, under a different government as well.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Liberal-left band. 444.hu reported the decree factually, building on the MTI material, under the headline “may issue arrest warrants and access DNA samples”, without evaluation. Its Wednesday article framed the Fürcht hearing in terms of expectations: we may get a look into the “dark secrets” of how the prosecution service worked under the NER if the former chief prosecutor really talks. Telex focused on the concrete cases of accountability. It wrote about the search at the National Film Institute quoting the institute’s statement, and about Gondosóra in an investigative article based on public-interest data it had requested. The paper also presented the new map-based grant search tool of the Bethlen Gábor Fund Manager, that is, the supply side of transparency as well. In subscriber articles, HVG published documents about the communications adviser of the Office of the Prosecutor General and about state contracts of the group of companies of former minister Tamás Fellegi. None of the papers published an analysis of the control of the NVVH’s new powers.

Public-affairs band. 24.hu reported that former Fidesz MP Miklós Simon was questioned as a suspect in a two-decade-old case after losing his parliamentary immunity. The framing emphasised the continuity of accountability. ATV wrote about the investigation into a MAVIR contract of a company linked to the wife of a former state secretary. It placed the emphasis on the competitive conditions of the public procurement, not on the criminal-law thread.

Economic band. Portfolio published the decree together with a summary of the NVVH’s operation so far: with the first four cases and the custody of Miklós Seszták. It presented the new powers as an expansion of the office’s capacity, not as a rule-of-law question.

Government-critical conservative band. In its article on the Fürcht hearing, Magyar Nemzet highlighted the position of the Office of the Prosecutor General, according to which the former chief prosecutor made untrue claims. The paper also highlighted that new disciplinary proceedings had been launched against Fürcht and that he had been suspended. According to the article’s headline, Fürcht resigned “because of the gold-convoy case”. At the same time, the paper also reported Fürcht’s claim that the investigation could not continue in the direction of the secret-service thread.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Publication of the NVVH decree Magyar Közlöny, 20 October 2026 (Interior Minister’s decree) 444.hu (MTI); Portfolio, 20 October 2026
New NVVH powers ordering wanted-person searches, issuing arrest warrants, wanted-persons register, criminal statistics system, DNA-sampling and biometric data-processing procedures 444.hu (MTI); Portfolio, 20 October 2026
Entry into force of the NVVH’s criminal-procedure powers 27 September 2026 24.hu, Telex, 27–28 September 2026
First NVVH custody Miklós Seszták, 28 September 2026 (Volánbusz case) Portfolio, 20 October 2026
Bringing in the arrested person within 24 hours before the issuing prosecution office or investigating authority, within 72 hours before the court Be. Section 119(2)
Legal remedy against the arrest warrant or the order of a wanted-person search none Be. Section 119(4); for searches, the wanted-person section of the Be.
NAV search at the National Film Institute 20 October 2026, suspicion of budget fraud Telex, 20 October 2026 (NFI statement, MTI)
Gondosóra: EU allocation and actual domestic spending HUF 108.7 billion allocation; HUF 79.26 billion in accounted project costs (2022–2025) and HUF 26.8 billion for 2026, together approx. HUF 106 billion Telex, 21 October 2026 (KSZK data release)
Gondosóra: amount paid to the main service provider HUF 77 billion (by 31 July 2026) Telex, 21 October 2026 (KSZK data release)
Gondosóra: users reached slightly more than 1 million people instead of the targeted 1.5 million Telex, 21 October 2026
NAIH report on Gondosóra data processing by the programme operator 3 September 2026 Telex, 21 October 2026
Questioning of Miklós Simon as a suspect 18 August 2026 24.hu, 20 October 2026
MAVIR cleaning contract net HUF 712.9 million, 13 of 18 bids declared invalid ATV, 20 October 2026

Two notes belong to the figures. The rows on the Be. are based on the text of the Act as promulgated in 2017; the text in force today must also be recorded in the map of legal bases (3.1). In the sources, the NVVH’s full name is Nemzeti Vagyonvisszaszerzési és Vagyonvédelmi Hivatal (National Office for Asset Recovery and Asset Protection). The title of the June bill still referred to Nemzeti Vagyonvisszaszerzési és Védelmi Hivatal.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the accountability of the NVVH as an independent investigation office (A10), the coercive-measures balance sheet as an indicator of institutional independence (A6), handling the former chief prosecutor’s disclosures (A5);
  • Justice (programme points) — the judge deciding on pre-trial detention as the ex-post control of the arrest warrant, and the constitutional review of the new powers (I10); the statistics must not affect the independence of judicial decisions (I4);
  • Public security and law enforcement (programme points) — the police and border policing as executors of NVVH arrest warrants, internal oversight of the investigating bodies (KB7);
  • Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points) — purpose-bound processing of biometric data and the risk of facial image analysis (D1).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the section on independent anti-corruption agencies, Rose-Ackerman starts from the observation that prosecution services often concentrate on politically less sensitive cases. The independent agency is the answer to this. In Hong Kong and Singapore, the turnaround came from leadership commitment, an independent agency based on a strong law, and civil-service reform together. The two models, however, differ in terms of control. The Hong Kong agency was more constrained by review committees and independent courts. According to the author, the Singapore agency was not subject to external control, and suspects occasionally accused it of unlawful, harsh conduct. Her closing sentence is the essence of today’s question:

“A tough, independent anticorruption agency can be a potent tool so long as it represents a credible long-term commitment and can avoid being misused for political ends.”

In other words, a strong, independent anti-corruption agency can be an effective tool as long as it represents a credible long-term commitment and avoids being used for political purposes. In the case of the NVVH, this means that the current expansion of powers follows the Hong Kong path only if it is accompanied by institutional external control. Examples are the publicity of the judicial acceptance rate (3.2), the opinion of the data protection authority (3.1) and the parliamentary report. The strength of the tools is no guarantee in itself; it is control that makes them acceptable under later governments with different majorities too.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999)

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In Book XI, Montesquieu links political liberty to moderate governments, but adds that it is not always present even in them. It exists only where there is no abuse of power. His reasoning:

“But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go.”

Experience thus shows that every person invested with power is apt to abuse it and extends their authority as far as possible. To prevent abuse, power must check power. In the same book, he also argues that there is no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from the executive. Hungarian criminal procedure follows this principle in that the arrest warrant may be issued by the prosecution service and the investigating authority, but only the judge may decide on pre-trial detention. With the NVVH’s new power, therefore, the question is not whether it may issue arrest warrants, but whether the judicial check is visible in practice too. Proposal 3.2 serves this purpose: the judicial acceptance rate makes the check between the two powers measurable.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (A törvények szelleméről), Book XI

6.4.3 European Union: General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

Under point 14 of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, biometric data means

“personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”.

Article 9 prohibits, as a general rule, the processing of genetic and biometric data for the purpose of unique identification, and allows it only with specified exceptions. Recital (19) of the Regulation, however, states that processing by authorities for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences is governed not by the Regulation but by a separate EU legal act, Directive (EU) 2016/680. The two sets of rules apply different standards. At the NVVH, this boundary runs within a single institution: in criminal cases it processes data under the criminal-law rules, and in public-asset protection investigations outside criminal proceedings under the General Data Protection Regulation. If a DNA profile or facial image obtained in a criminal case could also pass into the investigation branch, purpose limitation would be breached within the institution. No one outside would see this. That is why point 3.1 proposes separating the data flow, logging queries and obtaining the NAIH’s opinion.

📖 Source: Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR), Article 4(14), Article 9 and recital (19)

6.5 International comparison

Hong Kong and Singapore. According to Rose-Ackerman’s account, the Hong Kong agency was given powers to detect and prosecute corruption cases (in practice, the decision on indictment is taken by Hong Kong’s justice body), while the powers of the Singapore agency were separately reinforced by the government. According to Rose-Ackerman’s comparison, the difference lay in control. Review committees and independent courts operated alongside the Hong Kong agency; in Singapore external control was weaker, and accusations of unlawful conduct also arose (see 6.4.1). The planned structure of the NVVH (election by the National Assembly, annual report, judicial control of coercive measures) points in the Hong Kong direction. The practical test is whether these channels also receive data.

Specialised prosecution bodies in Europe. Several EU member states operate specialised anti-corruption prosecution bodies. These typically work within the prosecution service, with its tools and subject to its controls. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) likewise investigates with prosecutorial powers in cases affecting the EU’s financial interests, and its coercive measures are reviewed by national courts. The particularity of the NVVH is that it received the tools of a prosecuting authority as a body outside the prosecution service. For this reason, control must be more visible than for a prosecution-service unit, where the internal hierarchy is also a brake.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A5 — Whistleblower system
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Anti-Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)

Justice

  • I4 — Protecting judicial independence
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Public security and law enforcement

  • KB7 — Anti-corruption internal oversight reform

Digitalisation and AI regulation

  • D1 — Responsible AI framework

Proposed new programme point: A coercive-measures balance sheet at every body with prosecutorial powers — quarterly statistics, without personally identifying data, on arrest warrants, wanted-person searches, the judicial acceptance rate of motions for pre-trial detention and biometric data queries — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 2):

Knowledge-base references (reference books):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council (GDPR)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A5, A6, A10)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point IDs: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Public security and law enforcement (programme points; programme point ID: KB7)
  • MIAK policy area: Digitalisation and AI regulation (programme points; programme point ID: D1)
  • MIAK legal background material: public-consultation material of the bill on the National Asset Recovery Office (June 2026)
  • MIAK press monitor, 21 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100

Supplementary public data sources (legislation):

  • Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure (Be.), Section 119 and the section on wanted-person searches — text as promulgated
  • Fundamental Law of Hungary — provisions on personal liberty and the protection of personal data

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