Part I — Situation overview

On 28 September 2026, in a secret ballot, the National Assembly did not elect Zoltán Szathmáry as Prosecutor General, whom President of the Republic András Baka had proposed for the post on 21 September. The nominee did not receive a single yes vote: 138 MPs voted no, one abstained, and the Fidesz–KDNP group did not take part in the vote (444.hu). The Tisza group did not give detailed reasons for its decision. Citing an earlier Telex article, 444.hu wrote that the involvement of the nominee’s brother in the gold convoy case may have been behind it. After the vote András Baka stated that he regards the decision not as a failure but as democracy at work, and that he will put forward a new nominee as soon as possible, still without political consultation. He also raised a procedural objection: he would have considered it justified for the governing party’s group to hear the nominee before the decision (444.hu, 24.hu). In the press processed by MIAK, no new nominee’s name had appeared by 5 October.

The situation did not arise overnight. Prosecutor General Gábor Bálint Nagy resigned in July. Since then Deputy Prosecutor General István Lajtár has been acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General; it was he who, on 22 September, also moved for the suspension of the immunity of three MPs. According to the summary by 444.hu, the departing head still had one of his deputies dismissed, while the other deputy turns 65 in December, upon which his service relationship ends by operation of law. If there is no elected Prosecutor General by then, the Office of the Prosecutor General may be left without a head. Meanwhile the organisation is taking decisions in the most sensitive cases. On 2 October the deputy chief prosecutor responsible for investigations at the Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office took the investigation of the gold convoy case into his own competence for reasons of expediency (HVG). In July MIAK raised the substantive yardstick for the succession, and on 29 September the public accountability of the interim leadership and the need for a deadlock rule. This analysis examines what exactly the law in force says, and where it is silent.

MIAK’s reading: the present stalemate is not a personal dispute but a built-in risk of the two-thirds election. The Fundamental Law deliberately requires consensus, so the deadlock may recur in any future constellation. The laws in force leave a gap at three points. There is no deadline either for the new nomination or for the parliamentary vote. The deputy exercises the full powers of the Prosecutor General without any time limit or limit on powers. And under the wording of the law, a new deputy may be proposed only by the Prosecutor General, so the chain of substitution can run out.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

The topic receives an interpretive framework from three classic authors. H. L. A. Hart is the defining British legal philosopher of 20th-century Oxford analytical jurisprudence. In his main work, The Concept of Law, he shows that what distinguishes a functioning legal system from the mere exercise of power is precisely that it bridges the transition from one legislator to another with succession rules fixed in advance. If there is no such rule, an intermediate state arises for the duration of the transition in which no one has an indisputable title to decide. Montesquieu is the legal philosopher of the French Enlightenment and the classic author of the theory of the separation of powers. In The Spirit of the Laws he describes the office of the public prosecutor as the continuous guardian of the citizens’ safety, whose work cannot stop even when the citizens are living their everyday lives in peace. Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of law and economics at Yale University, in her book Corruption and Government, ties the protection of independent decision-makers to three elements: a transparent appointment procedure, conflict-of-interest limits and security of tenure. In the case of the acting Prosecutor General, the first and the third elements are missing. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first two require the amendment of the cardinal acts on the prosecution service, which the National Assembly can adopt with two thirds of the MPs present. The third is partly a statutory and partly a voluntary commitment. None of the proposals affects the two-thirds election rule laid down in Article 29 of the Fundamental Law.

3.1 A time-limited, unbreakable chain of succession (legislative proposal by 31 October 2026, adoption by 30 November 2026)

Section 11(3) of the Act on the Prosecution Service in force (Act CLXIII of 2011) settles substitution in a single sentence. If the office of Prosecutor General is vacant, the powers are exercised by the deputy prosecutor general designated in advance. Deputy prosecutors general are appointed by the President of the Republic, but only on the proposal of the Prosecutor General (Section 14 of Act CLXIV of 2011). The deputy’s mandate ends when he reaches the age that terminates his service relationship. MIAK proposes four additions. First: there should be a deadline. The President of the Republic should make a proposal within 30 days of the office becoming vacant or of a rejecting vote, and the National Assembly should vote within 30 days of receiving the proposal. The deadline fixes by when, not whom, the head of state should nominate. Second: the law should lay down a complete order of substitution. The deputy designated in advance should be followed by the other deputy in office. If there is neither, the prosecutors’ council operating at the Office of the Prosecutor General and elected by prosecutors should, within eight days and by secret ballot, designate an acting head from among senior prosecutors with at least ten years of experience. Third: after announcing his resignation, the departing Prosecutor General should no longer be able to propose the dismissal of a deputy or change the order of substitution. Fourth: if the chain were nevertheless to run out despite the statutory order, the acting head should be able to propose a new deputy with the opinion of the prosecutors’ council. On the basis of the current text it is not clear whether the deputy may also exercise this power of the Prosecutor General. According to Hart’s proposition on the rule of succession (see 6.4.1), continuity must be settled in advance, not in the middle of a crisis. The I10 constitutional stress test serves precisely as an advance trial of such situations.

3.2 A catalogue of the acting head’s powers and its subsequent review (in the same legislative amendment, by 30 November 2026)

Under the rule in force, the deputy exercises the full powers of the Prosecutor General, without a time limit. These include withdrawing an investigation from any investigating authority and moving for the suspension of immunity (Section 11(2)(b) and (e) of the Act on the Prosecution Service). A superior prosecutor may take any case into his own competence or assign another prosecutor to it (Section 13(1)). At the same time, the Prosecutor General may not be instructed by anyone to take an individual decision (Section 3(3)). This guarantee of independence also protects the acting head, but there is no parliamentary election behind it. MIAK proposes a three-tier catalogue. Freely exercisable are day-to-day management, the conduct of pending cases and motions concerning immunity. Restricting the latter would paralyse accountability, and in any case it is the National Assembly that decides on it. Exercisable subject to an additional duty to give reasons are the withdrawal of an investigation, the transfer of a case and assignment in high-profile cases. In such cases the written reasons for the decision are placed on the file. The newly elected Prosecutor General is then obliged to review these within 60 days of taking office, and to inform the National Assembly of the result in his first annual report. Not exercisable are the powers that shape the organisation durably: issuing new normative instructions of the Prosecutor General (unless compelled by a change in legislation), appointing senior officials and revoking senior assignments, initiating the dismissal of a deputy, and organisational restructuring. Montesquieu (see 6.4.2) ties the continuous functioning of the public prosecutor to the safety of the citizens. The catalogue therefore does not halt the prosecution service; it only restricts leadership without an election from leaving a lasting mark on the organisation.

3.3 Public, reasoned nomination and resolving the deadlock while leaving the two-thirds rule intact (legislative amendment by 30 November 2026, constitutional step in 2027 at the earliest)

Under Article 9(3)(j) of the Fundamental Law, the President of the Republic makes a proposal for the person of the Prosecutor General. This requires no countersignature by a member of the Government, so the nomination is an independent power of the head of state. The Government has no say in it, and the election belongs to the National Assembly. Under the Act on the National Assembly, a committee hearing of the nominee is mandatory if an act so provides. MIAK proposes three steps. First: the act on the status of prosecutors should prescribe that, within 15 days of receipt of the proposal, the competent committee of the National Assembly hear the nominee in a public sitting and submit its opinion in writing, with reasons. Because of the free mandate, MPs are not obliged to give reasons for their votes. MIAK therefore asks the parliamentary groups to publish their reasons voluntarily in the event of a rejection. Second: MIAK asks the President of the Republic, as a voluntary commitment, to make public the nomination criteria and the range of professional organisations consulted. According to András Baka, he consulted widely; making this public would strengthen the nominee’s credibility. Third: if two successive nominees fail, a rule for resolving the deadlock should come into effect. The solution preferred by the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, is that in such a case a politically neutral body outside parliament should draw up a shortlist of candidates (see 6.5). This would restrict the head of state’s right of nomination, so it requires an amendment of the Fundamental Law, and MIAK proposes it only if the first two steps are not enough. MIAK does not propose lowering the two-thirds threshold, because that would eliminate precisely the compulsion to reach consensus. According to Rose-Ackerman’s framework (see 6.4.3), transparent appointment is itself a guarantee of independence. This extends the depoliticised appointment logic of programme point I4 to the head of the prosecution service.

The three proposals are connected by one principle: the compulsion to reach consensus in selecting the Prosecutor General must be retained, but its price cannot be a prosecution service that is leaderless or led on an interim basis with unlimited powers. The deadline presses the political actors to decide. The chain of succession ensures that there is always someone to act, and the catalogue of powers ensures that whoever acts without an election cannot durably restructure the organisation. All three rules must be laid down in advance, applying equally to every future government and head of state. The measurement of institutional independence under programme point A6 is the test of this.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Rule of law Substitution depends on a rule known in advance, not on the last personnel decisions of the departing head An urgent amendment may look like legislation tailored to an individual situation, so it keeps its credibility only if it applies equally to every future case
Functioning of the prosecution service The prosecution service is not left without a head for a single day, and the December age limit causes no break in operations The boundaries of the catalogue of powers will be disputed (what counts as organisational restructuring), which may give rise to internal disputes of legal interpretation
Accountability and pending cases Immunity motions and high-profile investigations continue, and sensitive case transfers can be reviewed afterwards The mandatory subsequent review burdens the new head’s first months, and may turn the reversal of the acting head’s decisions into a political weapon
Public-law relations The deadline presses both the head of state and the National Assembly to decide; neither can play for time with impunity The pressure of the deadline may lead to the acceptance of a weaker compromise nominee; a neutral nominating body cannot be set up without a constitutional amendment
Public trust The public hearing and the written reasons translate the nomination dispute into arguments The public hearing may make the nominee a target of political attacks, which may deter good professionals

The most important question to weigh is the narrowing of the acting head’s powers. If the catalogue is too narrow, the interim prosecution service weakens precisely when the most high-profile corruption cases are running. That is why the proposal leaves immunity motions and the conduct of pending cases free, and why for case transfers it relies on reasons and subsequent review instead of a ban. The prohibited range covers only those decisions that would shape the profile of the organisation even after the elected head takes office: senior appointments and normative instructions.

The risk of the deadline is that the political actors may, under compulsion, accept a less convincing nominee. The Venice Commission’s 2012 opinion, specifically on the Hungarian laws on the prosecution service, regarded this pressure as intended: the risk of a leaderless period should encourage parliament to hold the election. The proposal works if the deadline and the chain of succession apply together. The deadline creates urgency, and the chain guarantees that the prosecution service does not stop while the urgency lasts.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators). These are suggested indicators, not commitments by the government or parliament.

  • The number of days without a head at the Office of the Prosecutor General. Target: 0 days. The December 2026 age-limit turning point is worth following separately.
  • The duration of the vacancy of the office. Target: at the next vacancy, a Prosecutor General elected within 90 days of the office becoming vacant. In the present case it is worth following when the National Assembly holds the election after the July resignation.
  • The reasons for, and review of, decisions on withdrawing, transferring and assigning cases taken during the acting period. Target: written reasons for 100% of the decisions taken in high-profile cases, and a review by the new Prosecutor General within 60 days, in the first annual report.
  • Public committee hearings of nominees. Target: a public hearing of every nominee for Prosecutor General within 15 days of receipt of the proposal, with a committee opinion giving written reasons.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the National Assembly, because only it can amend the cardinal acts on the prosecution service. The Government may also prepare the bill, but neither the Government nor the justice ministry may interfere in the functioning of the prosecution service. By 30 November 2026, before the December age-limit turning point, nomination with deadlines, the complete order of succession and the catalogue of the acting head’s powers should be written into law, together with the public committee hearing. From the President of the Republic, MIAK asks for the voluntary publication of the nomination criteria; from the parliamentary groups, the publication of their reasons in the event of a rejection. The two-thirds election rule does not need to be changed.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and ideology-free decision-making are concerned here. Accountability, because the prosecution service is now headed, in high-profile cases, by someone whom no one elected for this, and over whose decisions there is currently no subsequent control. Ideology-free, because the deadlock rule does not help either side of the present nomination dispute: it protects the minority of the day from the majority’s playing for time just as much as it protects the majority from a blocking minority.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, 444.hu was the only outlet that, in its report on the vote, also pointed to the chain of substitution. It wrote that the departing head had dismissed one of his deputies and that the other would reach the age limit in December, and in the title of the background piece attached to the article it raised the question of who would act if another immunity motion were needed. In its article on the statement of the Office of the Prosecutor General of 29 September, the outlet assessed the organisation’s situation as its deepest crisis since the regime change. Telex presented the statement as a response to the Prime Minister’s public remarks on the gold convoy case. HVG reported the facts of the vote in a live feed, and later the Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office’s decision to take over competence, noting that the statement did not make clear what expediency meant in the case.

In the mainstream band, 24.hu foregrounded András Baka’s procedural reservations: according to the head of state, the nomination would have deserved a hearing, and a career in the prosecution service does not in itself prove political ties. Index reported that the criminal complaints relating to the gold convoy case had been moved to Szeged, based on a statement by a lawyer who had filed a complaint. In a video summary, ATV put the emphasis on the head of state putting forward a new nominee but holding no political consultation. In the business press, Portfolio published the MTI report and highlighted the head of state’s sentence that the next Prosecutor General must serve the law, not the expectations of the government, the opposition or the head of state.

In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet framed the statement of the Office of the Prosecutor General as a response to the Prime Minister’s attacks on the prosecution service, and linked it to the fact that the prosecution service may question the head of government as a suspect in the phone theft case. In the sources processed by MIAK, Mandiner did not put the topic in focus. Common to the whole spectrum is that attention was directed at the person of the nominee and at the exchange of messages between political actors. None of the outlets separately analysed the statutory rule of substitution, the powers of the acting head or the absence of a deadline.

6.2 Facts and data

Rules in force on the election and substitution of the Prosecutor General:

Rule Content Legal source
Election Elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of the President of the Republic for nine years, by the votes of two thirds of all MPs Fundamental Law, Article 29(4)
Right of nomination The President of the Republic makes a proposal for the person of the Prosecutor General; this requires no countersignature by a member of the Government Fundamental Law, Article 9(3)(j) and (5)
Reporting The Prosecutor General reports annually to the National Assembly Fundamental Law, Article 29(5)
Detailed rules The organisation of the prosecution service and the status of prosecutors are regulated by a cardinal act (its adoption requires two thirds of the MPs present) Fundamental Law, Article 29(7)
Freedom from instruction The Prosecutor General may not be instructed, directly or indirectly, to take an individual decision with a specific content Act CLXIII of 2011, Section 3(3)
Substitution In case of impediment or vacancy, the powers are exercised by the deputy prosecutor general designated in advance; the text contains no time limit and no limit on powers Act CLXIII of 2011, Section 11(3)
Remaining in office after expiry Only on expiry of the nine-year mandate does the Prosecutor General exercise his powers until the successor takes office; not upon resignation Act CLXIV of 2011, Section 22(2)
Appointment of a deputy Appointed by the President of the Republic for an indefinite period, on the proposal of the Prosecutor General Act CLXIV of 2011, Section 14(1)
Dismissal of a deputy The President of the Republic may dismiss him at any time, without giving reasons, on the proposal of the Prosecutor General Act CLXIV of 2011, Section 24(2)
Termination of a deputy’s mandate on account of age Ends on reaching the age that terminates the service relationship (the general old-age pension age, but at least 65) Act CLXIV of 2011, Section 24(1)(c) and Section 24/A
Immunity motion Before an indictment, it is submitted to the Speaker by the Prosecutor General (or by the head of the National Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office designated by law) Act XXXVI of 2012, Section 74(3)
Committee hearing Mandatory if an act so provides Act XXXVI of 2012, Section 44(2)

The legislative texts are taken from the National Legislation Database as in force on 1 October 2026.

Timeline of the stalemate:

Date Event Source
July 2026 Prosecutor General Gábor Bálint Nagy resigns; the powers are exercised by Deputy Prosecutor General István Lajtár 444.hu
21 September 2026 President of the Republic András Baka proposes Zoltán Szathmáry as Prosecutor General MIAK press monitor, 22 September 2026
22 September 2026 The deputy acting with the powers of the Prosecutor General moves for the suspension of the immunity of three MPs MIAK press monitor, 23 September 2026
28 September 2026 In a secret ballot the National Assembly does not elect the nominee (0 yes, 138 no, 1 abstention) 444.hu
29 September 2026 In a statement, the Office of the Prosecutor General rejects politicians’ statements threatening prosecutors Telex, 444.hu, 24.hu, Magyar Nemzet
2 October 2026 The Central Investigating Chief Prosecutor’s Office takes the investigation of the gold convoy case into its own competence HVG
December 2026 According to press reports, the deputy remaining in office turns 65 444.hu

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Justice (programme points) — the assignment is thematic: under Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, the prosecution service is an independent constitutional organ, not part of the judicial branch of the courts. The depoliticised appointment logic (programme point ID: I4) and the constitutional stress test (programme point ID: I10) can nevertheless be applied directly to the selection and substitution of the Prosecutor General;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — measuring the functioning of checks and balances, including the selection of the heads of independent institutions and leaderless periods (programme point ID: A6);
  • Public administration and e-government (programme points) — the principle of criteria-based, pre-vetted selection of senior officials, already formulated for public administration by the civil servant selection system (programme point ID: KI7);
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the distinction between the prosecution service and the judiciary; the coordinate relationship between the Prosecutor General and the justice ministry; the difference between a two-thirds election and governmental power of instruction.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

In the fourth chapter of his main work, Hart uses the example of an imaginary absolute monarch, Rex, to examine what ensures the continuity of legislative power. If after Rex’s death his son, Rex II, begins issuing orders, the fact of obedience shown to his father says nothing yet about whether the son’s orders also count as law. If the legal system rested only on obedience, an interim period would arise for the duration of the transition in which no one could make valid law. According to Hart, therefore, every functioning legal system, even an absolute monarchy, bridges the transition from one legislator to another with succession rules fixed in advance. These rules determine the conditions of the successor’s eligibility and the method of his selection. Hart introduces the concepts of title and right of succession precisely to describe this. Applied to the Hungarian prosecution service: the rule in force fixes only the first step: the title of the designated deputy. If he drops out, there is no successor determined in advance. The situation arising after December would be exactly the interim period Hart writes about, and which legal systems deliberately avoid.

📖 Source: H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law

6.4.2 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

In one of the early chapters on criminal justice, in the passage on public accusation, Montesquieu praises the French arrangement of his time. Under it, the prince appoints an officer to every court who prosecutes all crimes in his name, so there is no need for private informers. He sums up the purpose of the office of the public prosecutor as follows:

“The public prosecutor watches for the safety of the citizens; he proceeds in his office while they enjoy their quiet and ease.”

Put plainly: the public prosecutor keeps watch over the citizens’ safety, and carries on his office even while they live in tranquillity. The sentence puts the continuity of public prosecution at the centre: the office exists so that citizens do not have to prosecute crime themselves. A prosecution service without a head, or with a head of uncertain legal status, endangers precisely this continuity. That is why MIAK proposes in point 3.2 that the acting head may freely carry on pending cases, and that the restriction apply only to decisions that shape the organisation durably.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the part on regulatory authorities, Rose-Ackerman writes that discretion can never be eliminated entirely. Decision-makers must therefore be protected from impermissible influence by three means: a transparent appointment procedure, conflict-of-interest limits and a security of tenure that insulates them from political pressure. In another chapter she discusses an independent prosecuting authority and judiciary as a basic condition of the anti-corruption system. Even the best anti-corruption law is ineffective if the institutions responsible for implementing it are not independent. In the case of the Hungarian acting Prosecutor General, two of the three protective elements are missing. He came to his position not through a public, parliamentary procedure, but by virtue of an earlier designation. His term of office is uncertain: it may end at any time with an election, and in December with the age limit. The public hearing obligation in point 3.3 substitutes for transparent appointment, and the deadline and chain of succession in point 3.1 for a predictable term of office. The text is a paraphrase because of the legal status of the source.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.5 International comparison

In 2010 the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, summarised the European standards on the independence of prosecution services (CDL-AD(2010)040). According to the report, where the Prosecutor General is elected by parliament, the danger of political influence may be reduced if the election is prepared by a parliamentary committee that also weighs expert opinion. A qualified majority can be a tool of consensus, but the report also states that an alternative solution must be provided for in case the required majority is not reached. The Prosecutor General should be elected for a long, non-renewable term, and the mandate should not coincide with the parliamentary term.

In 2012 the Venice Commission gave an opinion specifically on the Hungarian Act on the Prosecution Service and Act on the Status of Prosecutors (CDL-AD(2012)008). At that time it objected to the reverse situation: a Prosecutor General whose mandate has expired remains in office until the successor is elected, so a minority of more than one third of MPs can keep him in office indefinitely by blocking the election. As a solution it proposed a deadline for the election, or the abolition of remaining in office. It added that it must also be avoided that the same minority can indefinitely prolong the interim leadership of a deputy appointed by the departing Prosecutor General. The body also raised the involvement of a prosecutors’ council in the interim solution. The present situation is the resignation variant of this warning from 14 years ago. Here it is not the old head who remains, but the deputy designated by him who leads without a deadline.

The most similar foreign case is Montenegro’s. According to the Venice Commission’s 2021 opinion (CDL-AD(2021)012), the mandate of the Supreme State Prosecutor there expired in October 2019, parliament was unable to muster the qualified majority, and so the prosecutorial council left the departing head in office as acting head. The planned amendment would have given the interim head a mandate of six months, renewable once. The body considered this too long and a circumvention of the qualified majority. It stated that it is unacceptable for an unelected prosecutor to perform interim functions indefinitely. The duration of the interim appointment must be tied to the operating time of the rule for resolving the deadlock (in the body’s terminology, an anti-deadlock mechanism). On the resolving rule itself, the body wrote that it prefers the solution in which, after unsuccessful parliamentary vote(s), the right of nomination passes to a neutral body outside parliament. It acknowledged, however, that such a body is difficult to find in a small country. The Hungarian proposal takes two elements from this: the temporal and substantive limits on acting leadership (3.1 and 3.2), and, in the longer term, the neutral body’s shortlist of candidates (3.3).

Justice

  • I4 — Protecting judicial independence (depoliticised appointment logic, by analogy)
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances

Public administration and e-government

  • KI7 — Civil servant selection and rotation system

Proposed new programme point: A deadlock rule for public-law offices elected by the National Assembly with a qualified majority — nomination with deadlines, an unbreakable chain of succession, a catalogue of the acting head’s powers and its subsequent review — for the Justice area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1; 30 September 2026 — topic 1; 3 October 2026 — topic 11):

Legal sources:

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 H. L. A. Hart: The Concept of Law
  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I4, I10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI7)
  • MIAK legal foundations: typical conceptual errors concerning the branches of power and institutional competences (background material)
  • MIAK topic monitor, 4 October 2026 — topic 1, score: 90/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 87/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 30 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 85/100

Supplementary public data sources:

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